# Round 4 vs. Binghamton GR (Aff)

## 1AC

### Inherency

#### Observation One: Inherency

#### Obama pushing nuclear incentives now.

Pistilli 12 (Melissa, reporting on market-shaking news in the resource and mining investment sector with Resource Investing News since 2008, 10-11-12, “Nuclear Power Prominent in US Presidential Candidates’ Energy Policies” 10/11 <http://uraniuminvestingnews.com/12783/nuclear-power-united-states-energy-policies-romney-obama-election.html>)

The Obama administration’s energy policy supports the expansion of nuclear energy. Under Obama, the government’s 2012 budget allocated $36 billion in loan guarantees for new nuclear reactors and more than $800 million in loan guarantees for nuclear research, an IBISWorld report states. The research report also highlights Obama’s Clean Electricity Standard and its push for more electricity to be produced from zero-carbon sources. “These climate-change policies will lead to a boost in nuclear-energy production,” said IBISWorld. New nuclear reactors approved This year, the US approved construction of reactors for the first time in nearly 30 years; they are expected to come online by 2017. The Southern Company (NYSE:SO) won approval from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct two new reactors at its Vogtle power plant near Waynesboro, Georgia. Currently, another 16 plants across the country have applied to the NRC to build 25 more reactors. Last month, the NRC issued a license that allows General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) to build and operate the first uranium enrichment plant with classified laser technology, a more cost-effective process than employing centrifuges. The plant “could provide a steady supply of uranium enriched right here in the US to the country’s nuclear reactors,” GLE CEO Chris Monetta said. The US Department of Energy (DOE) “has played a pivotal role in advancing a public-private cost-sharing program that supports the development of smaller reactors,” according to former Environmental Protection Agency administrator and former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman and Dr. Patrick More, co-founder and former leader of Greenpeace — current co-chairs of the Clean and Safe Energy Coalition. Where will waste go? However, the US nuclear revival has been held up by the fact that the country lacks a long-term plan for dealing with nuclear waste. Currently, most plants keep waste onsite in temporary storage pools, but that is only a short-term solution to a long-term problem. In June 2012, a federal appeals court ruled that the NRC has not provided “reasonable assurance” that it has a long-term waste-management solution — as a result, the NRC will not be approving any new projects for some time. The plan had been to move waste to a repository at Nevada’s Yucca Mountain. The US government has already signed contracts with several utilities, including Southern, for waste disposal at Yucca Mountain. The repository was supposed to open in 1998, but politics and legal issues stalled the project for years. Obama put the project on ice in 2010, appointing the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to develop recommendations for creating a safe, long-term solution to nuclear waste management and storage. The Commission delivered its final report in January of this year, calling for the creation of a federal agency aimed at soliciting and evaluating voluntary proposals from states interested in hosting nuclear disposal areas. The idea is similar to what Romney proposed in October 2011 and would involve states offering disposal sites in exchange for monetary compensation. What next? The freeze on new reactor approvals hasn’t stopped the Obama administration from pushing forward on nuclear energy research and development. In late September, the US Department of Energy announced $13 million in funding for university-led nuclear innovation projects under the Nuclear Energy University Programs (NEUP). “The awards … build upon the Obama Administration’s broader efforts to promote a sustainable nuclear industry in the U.S. and cultivate the next generation of scientists and engineers,” the DOE press release states. The funding was awarded to research groups at the Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the University of Tennessee.

#### There’s global expansion of nuclear now – Fukushima doesn’t matter.

Marketwire 12 (5/3/12, – Part of the Paragon Report on uranium ore stock future

<http://finance.yahoo.com/news/nuclear-renaissance-back-track-122000381.html>)

NEW YORK, NY--(Marketwire -05/03/12)- Last year the Fukushima disaster in Japan started a downward spiral for companies in the Uranium Industry. Approximately one year later the industry looks to be finally recovering as the Global X Uranium ETF (URA) is up nearly 12 percent year-to-date. "Fukushima put a speed bump on the road to the nuclear renaissance," Ganpat Mani, president of Converdyn, said at a nuclear industry summit. "It's not going to delay the programs around the world." The Paragon Report examines investing opportunities in the Uranium Industry and provides equity research on Cameco Corporation (CCJ - News) and Uranium One, Inc. (UUU.TO - News). Approximately 650 million people in China and India currently are living without electricity. With the high costs of fossil fuel the most viable options for these countries would be nuclear power. Indonesia, Egypt, and Chile are among some of the nations that have plans to build their first nuclear power station, the list of countries operating atomic plants currently stands at 30. According to numbers released by the World Nuclear Association there are 61 reactors that are presently under construction, and plans to build another 162. "In two years, there will be very strong demand on the market, as new reactors start operating, and as new contracts with the existing fleet kick in," Areva SA's Chief Commercial Officer Ruben Lazo said in a previous interview.

#### But, the US is not reversing course on reprocessing.

Saillan 10 (Charles, attorney with the New Mexico Environment Department, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2010, “DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE: A PERSISTENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM”, Vol. 34, RSR)

The U.S. government’s position on reprocessing changed in 1974 when India exploded a nuclear weapon in the state of Rajasthan. 150 The weapon’s plutonium was isolated with reprocessing equipment imported for “peaceful purposes.” 151 Rightly concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, President Ford announced that the United States would no longer view reprocessing as a necessary step in the nuclear fuel cycle. He called on other nations to place a three-year moratorium on the export of reprocessing technology. 152 In 1977, President Carter indefinitely deferred domestic efforts at reprocessing and continued the export embargo. 153 Although President Reagan reversed the ban on domestic reprocessing in 1981, 154 the nuclear industry has not taken the opportunity to invest in the technology. In 2006, the George W. Bush Administration proposed a Global Nuclear Energy Partner ship (“GNEP”) for expanded worldwide nuclear power production. 155 As a key component of the GNEP proposal, the United States would provide other nations with a reliable supply of nuclear fuel, and it would take back the spent fuel for reprocessing at a commercial facility in the United States, thus avoiding the spread of reprocessing technology. 156 However, the Obama Administration substantially curtailed GNEP in 2009, and is “no longer pursuing domestic commercial reprocessing.” 157

### Observation 2

#### Observation Two: Peak Uranium

#### Peak uranium is coming by 2016.

Keen 12 (Kip, Uranium supply crunch by 2016 - nuclear expert says, Mineweb, 24 January 2012, http://www.mineweb.co.za/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page72103?oid=143915&sn=Detail&pid=102055, da 8-27-12)

A nuclear expert gave uranium supply three more years - at most - before it seriously falls behind demand from the nuclear power industry.¶ "2016: We have to have supply in the market or the lights will gradually go out in the nuclear system," said Thomas Drolet, the president of Drolet & Associates Energy Services, during a presentation at Cambridge House's Vancouver Resource Investment conference on Monday.¶ A uranium supply crunch is widely anticipated to hit the nuclear industry starting next year as Cold War era sources of uranium dry up. To illustrate the severity of the shortage that the nuclear industry faces, Drolet highlighted 2010 uranium production from mining - 118 million pounds - versus consumption: 190 million pounds.¶ "You can do the delta difference yourself," Drolet said, referring to how much of a supply gap miners will have to make up for in coming years. ¶ That uranium is "going to have to come from somewhere," he said.¶ The Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, Drolet argued, only delayed the onset of the coming pinch on uranium supply. But even in his "downside" analysis the uranium deficit still comes by 2015.

#### Increased domestic production of uranium is key to our tritium supply – foreign sources cannot solve.

Rowny 12 [edward, retired Lieutenant General, was chief negotiator with the rank of ambassador in the START arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and has served as an arms control adviser and negotiator for five presidents, Roll Call, 3-29-2012,

http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57\_118/edward-rowny-safe-uranium-enrichment-should-be-us-priority-213505-1.html]

Oil may grab headlines, but nuclear power for civilian use is growing, as it should. It is efficient, extremely safe and friendly to the environment. As with oil, the U.S. would be wise to produce its own supply of enriched uranium, the fuel for nuclear power plants. Farming out the process to other nations — or to companies headquartered overseas — is risky and increases our vulnerabilities. The U.S. government should pay more attention than it has in recent years to the nation’s dwindling ability to enrich its own uranium. The consequences of doing otherwise could be dramatic. Our country could **find itself at the mercy** of foreigners who do not have our best interests at heart. Energy independence, a laudable aspiration for oil, is even more essential for nuclear power. Domestically produced supplies of enriched uranium are already running short. The U.S. once produced most of the world’s enriched uranium. Now we’re down to about a quarter of the world’s supply. For reasons of national security, we shouldn’t dip further. That’s why the president should be praised for requesting $150 million in next year’s National Nuclear Security Administration budget to keep uranium enrichment alive on our soil. In the meantime, Chu has asked Congress for the authority to reallocate his current budget resources for that purpose until next year’s budget is enacted. Without this cash infusion, American technology at a major facility in rural Ohio will face an uncertain future. We can’t afford the uncertainty. Military considerations also play a role here. Nuclear weapons, while thankfully on the decline, still exist and must be maintained and updated. International treaties mandate that tritium, a rare, radioactive isotope that’s a byproduct of enriched uranium use in nuclear reactors and is critical to the proper, safe functioning of nuclear weapons, must be made with U.S. technology. Unless U.S. technology is available to make the enriched uranium needed to produce tritium, our national security will be at risk.

#### That’s key to the nuclear deterrent.

Gaffney 10 (Frank, founder and president of the Center for Security Policy, “There Goes the Nuclear Deterrent”, Breitbart, 10-14-2010, <http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2010/10/14/There-Goes-the-Nuclear-Deterrent>)

The House Armed Services Committee warned in 1993 that the deterrent was being subjected to “erosion by design” – and thanks to these sorts of deliberate actions – those chickens are coming home to roost today, with a vengeance. ¶ Now, we learn that the stockpile is literally running out of gas. ¶ A key ingredient used to boost the explosive power of thermonuclear devices is a gas called tritium. Unlike other radioactive materials used in such weapons (notably, plutonium and uranium), the usefulness of tritium degrades fairly quickly – its “half-life” is only about 12 years. As a result, the tritium reservoirs in our bombs and missile warheads must be regularly refueled in order for those weapons to remain operable.

#### Nuclear deterrence necessary to deter rogue states, CBW attacks, power challengers, and allied proliferation - impact is extinction.

Schneider 9 (Mark, Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, May/April 2009 “The Future of the US Nuclear Deterrent” Comparative Strategy, p345-360)

According to the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States must maintain a “robust nuclear deterrent, which remains a keystone of U.S. national power.”98 The reason should be self evident—without a nuclear deterrent the United States could be destroyed as an industrial civilization and our conventional forces could be defeated by a state with grossly inferior conventional capability but powerful WMD. We cannot afford to ignore existing and growing threats to the very existence of the United States as a national entity. Missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities, while critically important elements of deterrence and national power, simply can’t substitute for nuclear deterrence. In light of the emerging “strategic partnership” between Russia and China and their emphasis on nuclear weapons it would be foolish indeed to size U.S. strategic nuclear forces as if the only threat we face is that of rogue states and discard the requirement that the U.S. nuclear deterrent be “second to none.” Ignoring the PRC nuclear threat because of Chinese “no first use” propaganda is just as irresponsible. Absent a nuclear deterrent to their WMD use, rogue states could defeat our forces by the combination of few nuclear EMP weapons and large chemical and biological attacks. The situation would be much worse if they build a more extensive nuclear strike capability as has been reported. Freezing U.S. nuclear forces at the technical level of the Reagan administration will assure that, within two decades, Russia, China, India, and probably others will be technically superior and U.S. deterrence ability against CBW attack will be reduced. United States nuclear forces must be modernized and tailored to enhance deterrence and damage limitation against the rogue WMD threat. WMD capabilities have given otherwise inconsequential states the ability to kill millions of people. The right combination of missile defense and conventional and nuclear strike capabilities provide the best deterrent and damage limiting capability against the rogue state threat. We must not ignore the requirement to provide extended deterrence to our allies. British and French nuclear forces are not large enough, and these nations are not perceived as tough enough, to provide a deterrent for NATO Europe against Russia. In the Far East, there is literally no nuclear deterrent capability against China other than that provided by the United States. Failure to provide a credible deterrent will result in a wave of nuclear proliferation with serious national security implications. When dealing with the rogue states, the issue is not the size of the U.S. nuclear deterrent but the credibility of its use in response to chemical or biological weapons use and its ability to conduct low collateral damage nuclear attacks against WMD capabilities and delivery systems including very hard underground facilities for purposes of damage limitation. We must also have the capability to respond promptly. The United States nuclear guarantee is a major deterrent to proliferation. If we do not honor that guarantee, or devalue it, many more nations will obtain nuclear weapons. If arms control really becomes a substitute for nuclear deterrence and defense, it may very well precipitate the most destructive war in history. Effective verification is essentially impossible, and verification is not a substitute for compliance. Today, arms control has become part of the problem rather than a solution to the problem. The abolition of the in-kind deterrent to CBW use—which deterred CBW use in World War II—is making the world more unsafe almost on a daily basis. The START and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaties prevent or inhibit the development of conventional strike capabilities with enhanced ability to counter WMD. The demise of the ABM Treaty, while very useful, does not completely address the problem of legacy arms control and its constraints upon U.S. conventional capabilities.

#### Adoption of reprocessing solves U.S. uranium needs

Sayre 11 (Edwin, engineering consultant, “Commercial Value of Used Nuclear Fuel Reprocessed with Elements Separated, Purified and Reduced to Metals”, NIST, 2011, <http://www.nist.gov/tip/wp/pswp/upload/164_commercial_value_used_nuclear_fuel_reprocessed.pdf>)

The commercial value of the elements in the used fuel as indicated in Table 1 is a big ¶ surprise for most people. The commercial value of over twenty million dollars a year each 1000 MW reactor is based on today’s value for the rare metals in the fission ¶ products and the fissile metals to be recycled in fuel. The accelerated use of these ¶ elements with future technology will probably make them worth more than double that ¶ commercial value in 2050.¶ The United States should be interested in determining the cost of reprocessing the used ¶ fuel and preparing the elements for commercial use. It is estimated roughly that there ¶ will be a considerable profit in the processing of the elements in the used fuel. DOE is ¶ supporting technical proposals for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) for ¶ computing and simulating the operations required for processing the used fuel and ¶ separating out the commercial elements to determine the cost. There will be further ¶ programs to optimize the technology for the processing and establishing the required ¶ facilities. It would be economically ideal to start up the first reprocessing facilities by ¶ 2020 to start using the used fuel with over 50 years of aging. ¶ Many other countries are moving forward in the reprocessing and recycling the actinides ¶ in fast breeder reactors to make fuel from all low enriched fuel for the future use in the ¶ thermal reactor power plants. There is enough used nuclear fuel and the uranium 238 ¶ stored away to meet all of the US energy requirements for the next 500 years with the ¶ proper technical planning and program operation.

### Observation 3

#### Observation Three: Warming

#### Warming is real and anthropogenic – carbon dioxide increase, polar ice records, melting glaciers, sea level rise all prove.

Prothero 12 (Donald, Lecturer in Geobiology at Cal Tech and Professor of Geology at Occidental College, 3-1-12, “How We Know Global Warming is Real and Human Caused," Skeptic, vol 17 no 2, EBSCO)

Converging Lines of Evidence¶ How do we know that global warming is real and primarily human caused? There are numerous lines of evidence that converge toward this conclusion.¶ 1. Carbon Dioxide Increase.¶ Carbon dioxide in our atmosphere has increased at an unprecedented rate in the past 200 years. Not one data set collected over a long enough span of time shows otherwise. Mann et al. (1999) compiled the past 900 years' worth of temperature data from tree rings, ice cores, corals, and direct measurements in the past few centuries, and the sudden increase of temperature of the past century stands out like a sore thumb. This famous graph is now known as the "hockey stick" because it is long and straight through most of its length, then bends sharply upward at the end like the blade of a hockey stick. Other graphs show that climate was very stable within a narrow range of variation through the past 1000, 2000, or even 10,000 years since the end of the last Ice Age. There were minor warming events during the Climatic Optimum about 7000 years ago, the Medieval Warm Period, and the slight cooling of the Little Ice Age in die 1700s and 1800s. But the magnitude and rapidity of the warming represented by the last 200 years is simply unmatched in all of human history. More revealing, die timing of this warming coincides with the Industrial Revolution, when humans first began massive deforestation and released carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by burning an unprecedented amount of coal, gas, and oil.¶ 2. Melting Polar Ice Caps.¶ The polar icecaps are thinning and breaking up at an alarming rate. In 2000, my former graduate advisor Malcolm McKenna was one of the first humans to fly over the North Pole in summer time and see no ice, just open water. The Arctic ice cap has been frozen solid for at least the past 3 million years (and maybe longer),4 but now the entire ice sheet is breaking up so fast that by 2030 (and possibly sooner) less than half of the Arctic will be ice covered in the summer.5 As one can see from watching the news, this is an ecological disaster for everything that lives up there, from the polar bears to the seals and walruses to the animals they feed upon, to the 4 million people whose world is melting beneath their feet. The Antarctic is thawing even faster. In February-March 2002, the Larsen B ice shelf - over 3000 square km (the size of Rhode Island) and 220 m (700 feet) thick- broke up in just a few months, a story typical of nearly all the ice shelves in Antarctica. The Larsen B shelf had survived all the previous ice ages and interglacial warming episodes over the past 3 million years, and even the warmest periods of the last 10,000 years- yet it and nearly all the other thick ice sheets on the Arctic, Greenland, and Antarctic are vanishing at a rate never before seen in geologic history.¶ 3. Melting Glaciers.¶ Glaciers are all retreating at the highest rates ever documented. Many of those glaciers, along with snow melt, especially in the Himalayas, Andes, Alps, and Sierras, provide most of the freshwater that the populations below the mountains depend upon - yet this fresh water supply is vanishing. Just think about the percentage of world's population in southern Asia (especially India) that depend on Himalayan snowmelt for their fresh water. The implications are staggering. The permafrost that once remained solidly frozen even in the summer has now Üiawed, damaging the Inuit villages on the Arctic coast and threatening all our pipelines to die North Slope of Alaska. This is catastrophic not only for life on the permafrost, but as it thaws, the permafrost releases huge amounts of greenhouse gases which are one of the major contributors to global warming. Not only is the ice vanishing, but we have seen record heat waves over and over again, killing thousands of people, as each year joins the list of the hottest years on record. (2010 just topped that list as the hottest year, surpassing the previous record in 2009, and we shall know about 2011 soon enough). Natural animal and plant populations are being devastated all over the globe as their environments change.6 Many animals respond by moving their ranges to formerly cold climates, so now places that once did not have to worry about disease-bearing mosquitoes are infested as the climate warms and allows them to breed further north.¶ 4. Sea Level Rise.¶ All that melted ice eventually ends up in the ocean, causing sea levels to rise, as it has many times in the geologic past. At present, the sea level is rising about 3-4 mm per year, more than ten times the rate of 0.10.2 mm/year that has occurred over the past 3000 years. Geological data show Üiat ttie sea level was virtually unchanged over the past 10,000 years since the present interglacial began. A few mm here or there doesn't impress people, until you consider that the rate is accelerating and that most scientists predict sea levels will rise 80-130 cm in just the next century. A sea level rise of 1.3 m (almost 4 feet) would drown many of the world's low-elevation cities, such as Venice and New Orleans, and low-lying countries such as the Netherlands or Bangladesh. A number of tiny island nations such as Vanuatu and the Maldives, which barely poke out above the ocean now, are already vanishing beneath the waves. Eventually their entire population will have to move someplace else.7 Even a small sea level rise might not drown all these areas, but they are much more vulnerable to the large waves of a storm surge (as happened with Hurricane Katrina), which could do much more damage than sea level rise alone. If sea level rose by 6 m (20 feet), most of die world's coastal plains and low-lying areas (such as the Louisiana bayous, Florida, and most of the world's river deltas) would be drowned.¶ Most of the world's population lives in lowelevation coastal cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Miami, and Shanghai. All of those cities would be partially or completely under water with such a sea level rise. If all the glacial ice caps melted completely (as they have several times before during past greenhouse episodes in the geologic past), sea level would rise by 65 m (215 feet)! The entire Mississippi Valley would flood, so you could dock an ocean liner in Cairo, Illinois. Such a sea level rise would drown nearly every coastal region under hundreds of feet of water, and inundate New York City, London and Paris. All that would remain would be the tall landmarks such as the Empire State Building, Big Ben, and the Eiffel Tower. You could tie your boats to these pinnacles, but the rest of these drowned cities would lie deep underwater.

#### Scientific consensus goes aff – 97% of the most qualified scientists in the field agree

Anderegg, et al. 10 (William (Department of Biology, Stanford University); James Prall (Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto); Jacob Harold (William and Flora Hewlett Foundation); and Stephen Schneider (Department of Biology, Stanford University and Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University), “Expert credibility in climate change”, PNAS, Vol. 17, No. 27, July 6, 2010, RSR

\*\*Note: ACC = Anthropogenic Climate Change, UE = those unconvinced by evidence and CE = those convinced by evidence.)

The UE group comprises only 2% of the top 50 climate researchers as ranked by expertise (number of climate publications), 3% of researchers of the top 100, and 2.5% of the top 200, excluding researchers present in both groups (Materials and Methods). This result closely agrees with expert surveys, indicating that ≈97% of self-identiﬁed actively publishing climate scientists agree with the tenets of ACC (2). Furthermore, this ﬁnding complements direct polling of the climate researcher community, which yields qualitative and self-reported researcher expertise (2). Our ﬁndings capture the added dimension of the distribution of researcher expertise, quantify agreement among the highest expertise climate researchers, and provide an independent assessment of level of scientiﬁc consensus concerning ACC. In addition to the striking difference in number of expert researchers between CE and UE groups, the distribution of expertise of the UE group is far below that of the CE group (Fig. 1). Mean expertise of the UE group was around half (60 publications) that of the CE group (119 publications; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 57,020; P < 10 −14 ), as was median expertise (UE = 34 publications; CE = 84 publications). Furthermore, researchers with fewer than 20 climate publications comprise ≈80% the UE group, as opposed to less than 10% of the CE group. This indicates that the bulk of UE researchers on the most prominent multisignatory statements about climate change have not published extensively in the peer-reviewed climate literature. We examined a subsample of the 50 most-published (highestexpertise) researchers from each group. Such subsampling facilitates comparison of relative expertise between groups (normalizing differences between absolute numbers). This method reveals large differences in relative expertise between CE and UE groups (Fig. 2). Though the top-published researchers in the CE group have an average of 408 climate publications (median = 344), the top UE researchers average only 89 publications (median = 68; Mann– Whitney U test: W = 2,455; P < 10 −15 ). Thus, this suggests that not all experts are equal, and top CE researchers have much stronger expertise in climate science than those in the top UE group. Finally, our prominence criterion provides an independent and approximate estimate of the relative scientiﬁc signiﬁcance of CE and UE publications. Citation analysis complements publication analysis because it can, in general terms, capture the quality and impact of a researcher’s contribution—a critical component to overall scientiﬁc credibility—as opposed to measuring a researcher’s involvement in a ﬁeld, or expertise (Materials and Methods). The citation analysis conducted here further complements the publication analysis because it does not examine solely climaterelevant publications and thus captures highly prominent researchers who may not be directly involved with the climate ﬁeld. We examined the top four most-cited papers for each CE and UE researcher with 20 or more climate publications and found immense disparity in scientiﬁc prominence between CE and UE communities (Mann–Whitney U test: W = 50,710; P < 10 −6 ; Fig. 3). CE researchers’ top papers were cited an average of 172 times, compared with 105 times for UE researchers. Because a single, highly cited paper does not establish a highly credible reputation but might instead reﬂect the controversial nature of that paper (often called the single-paper effect), we also considered the average the citation count of the second through fourth most-highly cited papers of each researcher. Results were robust when only these papers were considered (CE mean: 133; UE mean: 84; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 50,492; P < 10 −6 ). Results were robust when all 1,372 researchers, including those with fewer than 20 climate publications, were considered (CE mean: 126; UE mean: 59; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 3.5 × 10 5 ; P < 10 −15 ). Number of citations is an imperfect but useful benchmark for a group’s scientiﬁc prominence (Materials and Methods), and we show here that even considering all (e.g., climate and nonclimate) publications, the UE researcher group has substantially lower prominence than the CE group. We provide a large-scale quantitative assessment of the relative level of agreement, expertise, and prominence in the climate researcher community. We show that the expertise and prominence, two integral components of overall expert credibility, of climate researchers convinced by the evidence of ACC vastly overshadows that of the climate change skeptics and contrarians. This divide is even starker when considering the top researchers in each group. Despite media tendencies to present both sides in ACC debates (9), which can contribute to continued public misunderstanding regarding ACC (7, 11, 12, 14), not all climate researchers are equal in scientiﬁc credibility and expertise in the climate system. This extensive analysis of the mainstream versus skeptical/contrarian researchers suggests a strong role for considering expert credibility in the relative weight of and attention to these groups of researchers in future discussions in media, policy, and public forums regarding anthropogenic climate change.

#### We must act quickly with long term technological innovation to avoid the irreversible climate change triggered by 2°C.

Peters, et al. 12(Glen (Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo); Robbie Andrew (Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo); Tom Boden (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge National Laboratory); Josep Canadell (Global Carbon Project, CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research, Canberra, Australia); Philippe Ciais (Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de l’Environnement, Gif sur Yvette, France); Corinne Le Quéré (Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK); Gregg Marland (Research Institute for Environment, Energy, and Economics, Appalachian State University); Michael R. Raupach (Global Carbon Project, CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research, Canberra, Australia); and Charlie Wilson (Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK), “The challenge to keep global warming below 2 °C”, Nature Climate Change, 12-2-12, RSR)

It is important to regularly re-assess the relevance of emissions scenarios in light of changing global circumstances3,8. In the past, decadal trends in CO2 emissions have responded slowly to changes in the underlying emission drivers because of inertia and path dependence in technical, social and political systems9. Inertia and path dependence are unlikely to be affected by short-term fluctuations2,3,9 — such as financial crises10 — and it is probable that emissions will continue to rise for a period even after global mitigation has started11. Thermal inertia and vertical mixing in the ocean, also delay the temperature response to CO2 emissions12. Because of inertia, path dependence and changing global circumstances, there is value in comparing observed decadal emission trends with emission scenarios to help inform the prospect of different futures being realized, explore the feasibility of desired changes in the current emission trajectory and help to identify whether new scenarios may be needed. Global CO2 emissions have increased from 6.1±0.3 Pg C in 1990 to 9.5±0.5 Pg C in 2011 (3% over 2010), with average annual growth rates of 1.9% per year in the 1980s, 1.0% per year in the 1990s, and 3.1% per year since 2000. We estimate that emissions in 2012 will be 9.7±0.5 Pg C or 2.6% above 2011 (range of 1.9–3.5%) and 58% greater than 1990 (Supplementary Information and ref. 13). The observed growth rates are at the top end of all four generations of emissions scenarios (Figs 1 and 2). Of the previous illustrative IPCC scenarios, only IS92-E, IS92-F and SRES A1B exceed the observed emissions (Fig. 1) or their rates of growth (Fig. 2), with RCP8.5 lower but within uncertainty bounds of observed emissions. Observed emission trends are in line with SA90-A, IS92-E and IS92-F, SRES A1FI, A1B and A2, and RCP8.5 (Fig. 2). The SRES scenarios A1FI and A2 and RCP8.5 lead to the highest temperature projections among the scenarios, with a mean temperature increase of 4.2–5.0 °C in 2100 (range of 3.5–6.2 °C)14, whereas the SRES A1B scenario has decreasing emissions after 2050 leading to a lower temperature increase of 3.5 °C (range 2.9–4.4°C)14. Earlier research has noted that observed emissions have tracked the upper SRES scenarios15,16 and Fig. 1 confirms this for all four scenario generations. This indicates that the space of possible pathways could be extended above the top-end scenarios to accommodate the possibility of even higher emission rates in the future. The new RCPs are particularly relevant because, in contrast to the earlier scenarios, mitigation efforts consistent with longterm policy objectives are included among the pathways2,. RCP3-PD (peak and decline in concentration) leads to a mean temperature increase of 1.5 °C in 2100 (range of 1.3–1.9 °C)14. RCP3–PD requires net negative emissions (for example, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage) from 2070, but some scenarios suggest it is possible to stay below 2 °C without negative emissions17–19. RCP4.5 and RCP6 — which lie between RCP3–PD and RCP8.5 in the longer term — lead to a mean temperature increase of 2.4 °C (range of 1.0–3.0 °C) and 3.0 °C (range of 2.6–3.7 °C) in 2100, respectively14. For RCP4.5, RCP6 and RCP8.5, temperatures will continue to increase after 2100 due to on-going emissions14 and inertia in the climate system12. Current emissions are tracking slightly above RCP8.5, and given the growing gap between the other RCPs (Fig. 1), significant emission reductions are needed by 2020 to keep 2 °C as a feasible goal18–20. To follow an emission trend that can keep the temperature increase below 2 °C (RCP3-PD) requires sustained global CO2 mitigation rates of around 3% per year, if global emissions peak before 202011,19. A delay in starting mitigation activities will lead to higher mitigation rates11, higher costs21,22, and the target of remaining below 2 °C may become unfeasible18,20. If participation is low, then higher rates of mitigation are needed in individual countries, and this may even increase mitigation costs for all countries22. Many of these rates assume that negative emissions will be possible and affordable later this century11,17,18,20. Reliance on negative emissions has high risks because of potential delays or failure in the development and large-scale deployment of emerging technologies such as carbon capture and storage, particularly those connected to bioenergy17,18. Although current emissions are tracking the higher scenarios, it is still possible to transition towards pathways consistent with keeping temperatures below 2 °C (refs 17,19,20). The historical record shows that some countries have reduced CO2 emissions over 10-year periods, through a combination of (non-climate) policy intervention and economic adjustments to changing resource availability. The oil crisis of 1973 led to new policies on energy supply and energy savings, which produced a decrease in the share of fossil fuels (oil shifted to nuclear) in the energy supply of Belgium, France and Sweden, with emission reductions of 4–5% per year sustained over 10 or more years (Supplementary Figs S17–19). A continuous shift to natural gas — partially substituting coal and oil — led to sustained mitigation rates of 1–2% per year in the UK in the 1970s and again in the 2000s, 2% per year in Denmark in the 1990–2000s, and 1.4% per year since 2005 in the USA (Supplementary Figs S10–12). These examples highlight the practical feasibility of emission reductions through fuel substitution and efficiency improvements, but additional factors such as carbon leakage23 need to be considered. These types of emission reduction can help initiate a transition towards trajectories consistent with keeping temperatures below 2 °C, but further mitigation measures are needed to complete and sustain the reductions. Similar energy transitions could be encouraged and co-ordinated across countries in the next 10 years using available technologies19, but well-targeted technological innovations24 are required to sustain the mitigation rates for longer periods17. To move below the RCP8.5 scenario — avoiding the worst climate impacts — requires early action17,18,21 and sustained mitigation from the largest emitters22 such as China, the United States, the European Union and India. These four regions together account for over half of global CO2 emissions, and have strong and centralized governing bodies capable of co-ordinating such actions. If similar energy transitions are repeated over many decades in a broader range of developed and emerging economies, the current emission trend could be pulled down to make RCP3‑PD, RCP4.5 and RCP6 all feasible futures. A shift to a pathway with the highest likelihood to remain below 2 °C above preindustrial levels (for example, RCP3-PD), requires high levels of technological, social and political innovations, and an increasing need to rely on net negative emissions in the future11,17,18. The timing of mitigation efforts needs to account for delayed responses in both CO2 emissions9 (because of inertia in technical, social and political systems) and also in global temperature12 (because of inertia in the climate system). Unless large and concerted global mitigation efforts are initiated soon, the goal of remaining below 2 °C will very soon become unachievable.

#### Scenario one is biodiversity

#### Warming and CO2 emissions kill biodiversity – newest research shows that ecosystems are on the brink due to human activity.

Barnosky et al 12 (Anthony (Department of Integrative Biology, University of California, Berkeley); Elizabeth Hadly (Department of Biology, Stanford University); Jordi Bascompte (Integrative Ecology Group, Estacion Biologica de Donana, Sevilla, Spain); Eric Berlow (TRU NORTH Labs, Berkeley, California); James H. Brown (Department of Biology, The University of New Mexico); Mikael Fortelius (Department of Geosciences and Geography and Finnish Museum of Natural History); Wayne Getz (Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berkeley); John Harte (Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berkeley); Alan Hastings (Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California – Davis); Pablo Marquet (Departamento de Ecologıa, Facultad de Ciencias Biologicas, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile); Neo Martinez (Pacific Ecoinformatics and Computational Ecology Lab); Arne Mooers (Department of Biological Sciences, Simon Fraser University); Peter Roopnarine (California Academy of Sciences); Geerta Vermeij (Department of Geology, University of California – Davis); John W. Williams (Department of Geography, University of Wisconsin); Rosemary Gilespie (Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berkeley); Justin Kitzes (Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berkeley); Charles Marshall (Department of Integrative Biology, University of California, Berkeley); Nicholas Matzke (Department of Integrative Biology, University of California, Berkeley); David Mindell ( Department of Biophysics and Biochemistry, University of California, San Francisco); Eloy Revilla (Department of Conservation Biology, Estacion Biologica de Donana); and Adam B. Smith (Center for Conservation and Sustainable Development, Missouri Botanical Garden), “Approaching a state shift in Earth’s biosphere”, Nature, May 2012, RSR)

As a result of human activities, direct local-scale forcings have accumulated to the extent that indirect, global-scale forcings of biological change have now emerged. Direct forcing includes the conversion of ,43% of Earth’s land to agricultural or urban landscapes, with much of the remaining natural landscapes networked with roads 1,2,34,35 . This exceeds the physical transformation that occurred at the last global-scale critical transition, when ,30% of Earth’s surface went from being covered by glacial ice to being ice free. The indirect global-scale forcings that have emerged from human activities include drastic modification of how energy flows through the global ecosystem. An inordinate amount of energy now is routed through one species, Homo sapiens. Humans commandeer ,20–40% of global net primary productivity 1,2,35 (NPP) and decrease overall NPP through habitat degradation. Increasing NPP regionally through atmospheric and agricultural deposition of nutrients (for example nitrogen and phosphorus) does not make up the shortfall 2 . Second, through the release of energy formerly stored in fossil fuels, humans have substantially increased the energy ultimately available to power the global ecosystem. That addition does not offset entirely the human appropriation of NPP, because the vast majority of that ‘extra’ energy is used to support humans and their domesticates, the sum of which comprises large-animal biomass that is far beyond that typical of pre-industrial times 27 . A decrease in this extra energy budget, which is inevitable if alternatives do not compensate for depleted fossil fuels, is likely to impact human health and economies severely 28 , and also to diminish biodiversity 27 , the latter because even more NPP would have to be appropriated by humans, leaving less for other species 36 . By-products of altering the global energy budget are major modifications to the atmosphere and oceans. Burning fossil fuels has increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations by more than a third (,35%) with respect to pre-industrial levels, with consequent climatic disruptions that include a higher rate of global warming than occurred at the last global-scale state shift 37 . Higher CO2 concentrations have also caused the ocean rapidly to become more acidic, evident as a decrease in pH by ,0.05 in the past two decades 38 . In addition, pollutants from agricultural run-off and urban areas have radically changed how nutrients cycle through large swaths of marine areas 16 . Already observable biotic responses include vast ‘dead zones’ in the near-shore marine realm39 , as well as the replacement of .40% of Earth’s formerly biodiverse land areas with landscapes that contain only a few species of crop plants, domestic animals and humans 3,40 . Worldwide shifts in species ranges, phenology and abundances are concordant with ongoing climate change and habitat transformation 41 . Novel communities are becoming widespread as introduced, invasive and agricultural species integrate into many ecosystems 42 . Not all community modification is leading to species reductions; on local and regional scales, plant diversity has been increasing, owing to anthropogenic introductions 42 , counter to the overall trend of global species loss 5,43 . However, it is unknown whether increased diversity in such locales will persist or will eventually decrease as a result of species interactions that play out over time. Recent and projected 5,44 extinction rates of vertebrates far exceed empirically derived background rates 25 . In addition, many plants, vertebrates and invertebrates have markedly reduced their geographic ranges and abundances to the extent that they are at risk of extinction 43 . Removal of keystone species worldwide, especially large predators at upper trophic levels, has exacerbated changes caused by less direct impacts, leading to increasingly simplified and less stable ecological networks 39,45,46 . Looking towards the year 2100, models forecast that pressures on biota will continue to increase. The co-opting of resources and energy use by humans will continue to increase as the global population reaches 9,500,000,000 people (by 2050), and effects will be greatly exacerbated if per capita resource use also increases. Projections for 2100 range from a population low of 6,200,000,000 (requiring a substantial decline in fertility rates) to 10,100,000,000 (requiring continued decline of fertility in countries that still have fertility above replacement level) to 27,000,000,000 (if fertility remains at 2005–2010 levels; this population size is not thought to be supportable; ref. 31). Rapid climate change shows no signs of slowing. Modelling suggests that for ,30% of Earth, the speed at which plant species will have to migrate to keep pace with projected climate change is greater than their dispersal rate when Earth last shifted from a glacial to an interglacial climate 47 , and that dispersal will be thwarted by highly fragmented landscapes. Climates found at present on 10–48% of the planet are projected to disappear within a century, and climates that contemporary organisms have never experienced are likely to cover 12–39% of Earth 48 . The mean global temperature by 2070 (or possibly a few decades earlier) will be higher than it has been since the human species evolved. The magnitudes of both local-scale direct forcing and emergent globalscaleforcing are much greater than those that characterized the last globalscale state shift, and are not expected to decline any time soon. Therefore, the plausibility of a future planetary state shift seems high, even though considerable uncertainty remains about whether it is inevitable and, if so, how far in the future it may be. The clear potential for a planetary-scale state shift greatly complicates biotic forecasting efforts, because by their nature state shifts contain surprises. Nevertheless, some general expectations can be gleaned from the natural experiments provided by past global-scale state shifts. On the timescale most relevant to biological forecasting today, biotic effects observed in the shift from the last glacial to the present interglacial (Box 1) included many extinctions 30,49–51 ; drastic changes in species distributions, abundances and diversity; and the emergence of novel communities 49,50,52–54 . New patterns of gene flow triggered new evolutionary trajectories 55–58 , but the time since then has not been long enough for evolution to compensate for extinctions. At a minimum, these kinds of effects would be expected from a globalscale state shift forced by present drivers, not only in human-dominated regions but also in remote regions not now heavily occupied by humans (Fig. 1); indeed, such changes are already under way (see above 5,25,39,41–44 ). Given that it takes hundreds of thousands to millions of years for evolution to build diversity back up to pre-crash levels after major extinction episodes 25 , increased rates of extinction are of particular concern, especially because global and regional diversity today is generally lower than it was 20,000 yr ago as a result of the last planetary state shift 37,50,51,54,59 . This large-scale loss of diversity is not overridden by historical increases in plant species richness in many locales, owing to human-transported species homogenizing the world’s biota 42 . Possible too are substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population 60 . Still unknown is the extent to which human-caused increases in certain ecosystem services—such as growing food—balances the loss of ‘natural’ ecosystem services, many of which already are trending in dangerous directions as a result of overuse, pollutants and climate change 3,16 . Examples include the collapse of cod and other fisheries 45,61,62 ; loss of millions of square kilometres of conifer forests due to climate-induced bark-beetle outbreaks; 63 loss of carbon sequestration by forest clearing 60 ; and regional losses of agricultural productivity from desertification or detrimental land-use practices 1,35 . Although the ultimate effects of changing biodiversity and species compositions are still unknown, if critical thresholds of diminishing returns in ecosystem services were reached over large areas and at the same time global demands increased (as will happen if the population increases by 2,000,000,000 within about three decades), widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life could result 64 .

#### The risk of keystone species loss leads to extinction – outweighs on reversibility.

Chen 2k (Jim, Professor of Law at University of Minnesota and Dean of Law School at Louisville, “Globalization and Its Losers”:, 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 157’ LexisNexis Legal)

Conscious decisions to allow the extinction of a species or the destruction of an entire ecosystem epitomize the "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" that NEPA is designed to retard.312 The original Endangered Species Act gave such decisions no quarter whatsoever;313 since 1979, such decisions have rested in the hands of a solemnly convened "God Squad."314 In its permanence and gravity, natural extinction provides the baseline by which all other types of extinction should be judged. The Endangered Species Act explicitly acknowledges the "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" of endangered species and the biodiversity they represent.315 Allied bodies of international law confirm this view:316 global biological diversity is part of the commonly owned heritage of all humanity and deserves full legal protec- tion.317 Rather remarkably, these broad assertions understate the value of biodiversity and the urgency of its protection. A Sand County Almanac, the eloquent bible of the modern environmental movement, contains only two demonstrable bio- logical errors. It opens with one and closes with another. We can forgive Aldo Leopold's decision to close with that elegant but erroneous epigram, "ontogeny repeats phylogeny."318 What concerns erns us is his opening gambit: "There are some who can live without wild things, and some who cannot."319 Not quite. None of us can live without wild things. Insects are so essential to life as we know it that if they "and other land-dwelling anthropods ... were to disappear, humanity probably could not last more than a few months."320 "Most of the amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals," along with "the bulk of the flowering plants and ... the physical structure of most forests and other terrestrial habitats" would disappear in turn.321 "The land would return to" something resembling its Cambrian condition, "covered by mats of recumbent wind-pollinated vegetation, sprinkled with clumps of small trees and bushes here and there, largely devoid of animal life."322 From this perspective, the mere thought of valuing biodiver- sity is absurd, much as any attempt to quantify all of earth's planetary amenities as some trillions of dollars per year is ab- surd. But the frustration inherent in enforcing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) has shown that conservation cannot work without appeasing Homo economicus, the profit-seeking ape. Efforts to ban the interna- tional ivory trade through CITES have failed to stem the slaugh- ter of African elephants.323 The preservation of biodiversity must therefore begin with a cold, calculating inventory of its benefits. Fortunately, defending biodiversity preservation in human- ity's self-interest is an easy task. As yet unexploited species might give a hungry world a larger larder than the storehouse of twenty plant species that provide nine-tenths of humanity's cur- rent food supply.324 "Waiting in the wings are tens of thousands of unused plant species, many demonstrably superior to those in favor."325 As genetic warehouses, many plants enhance the pro- ductivity of crops already in use. In the United States alone, the lates phylogeny" means that the life history of any individual organism replays the entire evolutionary history of that organism's species. genes of wild plants have accounted for much of "the explosive growth in farm production since the 1930s."326 The contribution is worth $1 billion each year.327 Nature's pharmacy demonstrates even more dramatic gains than nature's farm.328 Aspirin and penicillin, our star analgesic and antibiotic, had humble origins in the meadowsweet plant and in cheese mold.329 Leeches, vampire bats, and pit vipers all contribute anticoagulant drugs that reduce blood pressure, pre- vent heart attacks, and facilitate skin transplants.330 Merck & Co., the multinational pharmaceutical company, is helping Costa Rica assay its rich biota.33' A single commercially viable product derived "from, say, any one species among... 12,000 plants and 300,000 insects ... could handsomely repay Merck's entire investment" of $1 million in 1991 dollars.332 Wild animals, plants, and microorganisms also provide eco- logical services.333 The Supreme Court has lauded the pes- ticidal talents of migratory birds.334 Numerous organisms process the air we breathe, the water we drink, the ground we stroll.335 Other species serve as sentries. Just as canaries warned coal miners of lethal gases, the decline or disappearance of indicator species provides advance warning against deeper environmental threats.336 Species conservation yields the great- est environmental amenity of all: ecosystem protection. Saving discrete species indirectly protects the ecosystems in which they live.337 Some larger animals may not carry great utilitarian value in themselves, but the human urge to protect these charis- matic "flagship species" helps protect their ecosystems.338 In- deed, to save any species, we must protect their ecosystems.339 Defenders of biodiversity can measure the "tangible eco- nomic value" of the pleasure derived from "visiting, photograph- ing, painting, and just looking at wildlife."340 In the United States alone, wildlife observation and feeding in 1991 generated $18.1 billion in consumer spending, $3 billion in tax revenues, and 766,000 jobs.341 Ecotourism gives tropical countries, home to most of the world's species, a valuable alternative to subsis- tence agriculture. Costa Rican rainforests preserved for ecotour- ism "have become many times more profitable per hectare than land cleared for pastures and fields," while the endangered go- rilla has turned ecotourism into "the third most important source of income in Rwanda."342 In a globalized economy where commodities can be cultivated almost anywhere, environmen- tally sensitive locales can maximize their wealth by exploiting the "boutique" uses of their natural bounty. The value of endangered species and the biodiversity they embody is "literally . . . incalculable."343 What, if anything, should the law do to preserve it? There are those that invoke the story of Noah's Ark as a moral basis for biodiversity preser- vation.344 Others regard the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, especially the biblical stories of Creation and the Flood, as the root of the West's deplorable environmental record.345 To avoid getting bogged down in an environmental exegesis of Judeo- Christian "myth and legend," we should let Charles Darwin and evolutionary biology determine the imperatives of our moment in natural "history."346 The loss of biological diversity is quite arguably the gravest problem facing humanity. If we cast the question as the contemporary phenomenon that "our descend- ants [will] most regret," the "loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats" is worse than even "energy depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or con- quest by a totalitarian government."347 Natural evolution may in due course renew the earth with a diversity of species approximating that of a world unspoiled by Homo sapiens - in ten mil- lion years, perhaps a hundred million.348

#### **Scenario two is agriculture**

#### Despite CO2 fertilization, massive rise of temperature due to warming causes food shortages —the result is extinction.

Strom 7 (Robert, Professor Emeritus of planetary sciences in the Department of Planetary Sciences at the University of Arizona, studied climate change for 15 years, the former Director of the Space Imagery Center, a NASA Regional Planetary Image Facility, “Hot House”, SpringerLink, p. 211-216)

 THE future consequences of global warming are the least known aspect of the problem. They are based on highly complex computer models that rely on inputs that are sometimes not well known or factors that may be completely unforeseen. Most models assume certain scenarios concerning the rise in greenhouse gases. Some assume that we continue to release them at the current rate of increase while others assume that we curtail greenhouse gas release to one degree or another. Furthermore, we are in completely unknown territory. The current greenhouse gas content of the atmosphere has not been as high in at least the past 650,000 years, and the rise in temperature has not been as rapid since civilization began some 10,000 years ago. What lies ahead for us is not completely understood, but it certainly will not be good, and it could be catastrophic. We know that relatively minor climatic events have had strong adverse effects on humanity, and some of these were mentioned in previous chapters. A recent example is the strong El Nin~o event of 1997-1998 that caused weather damage around the world totaling $100 billion: major flooding events in China, massive fires in Borneo and the Amazon jungle, and extreme drought in Mexico and Central America. That event was nothing compared to what lies in store for us in the future if we do nothing to curb global warming. We currently face the greatest threat to humanity since civilization began. This is the crucial, central question, but it is very difficult to answer (Mastrandea and Schneider, 2004). An even more important question is: "At what temperature and environmental conditions is a threshold crossed that leads to an abrupt and catastrophic climate change?'' It is not possible to answer that question now, but we must be aware that in our ignorance it could happen in the not too distant future. At least the question of a critical temperature is possible to estimate from studies in the current science literature. This has been done by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Germany's leading climate change research institute (Hare, 2005). According to this study, global warming impacts multiply and accelerate rapidly as the average global temperature rises. We are certainly beginning to see that now. According to the study, as the average global temperature anomaly rises to 1 °C within the next 25 years (it is already 0.6'C in the Northern Hemisphere), some specialized ecosystems become very stressed, and in some developing countries food production will begin a serious decline, water shortage problems will worsen, and there will be net losses in the gross domestic product (GDP). At least one study finds that because of the time lags between changes in radiative forcing we are in for a 1 °C increase before equilibrating even if the radiative forcing is fixed at today's level (Wetherald et al., 2001). It is apparently when the temperature anomaly reaches 2 °C that serious effects will start to come rapidly and with brute force (International Climate Change Taskforce, 2005). At the current rate of increase this is expected to happen sometime in the middle of this century. At that point there is nothing to do but try to adapt to the changes. Besides the loss of animal and plant species and the rapid exacerbation of our present problems, there are likely to be large numbers of hungry, diseased and starving people, and at least 1.5 billion people facing severe water shortages. GDP losses will be significant and the spread of diseases will be widespread (see below). We are only about 30 years away from the 440 ppm CO2 level where the eventual 2'C global average temperature is probable. When the temperature reaches 3 'C above today's level, the effects appear to become absolutely critical. At the current rate of greenhouse gas emission, that point is expected to be reached in the second half of the century. For example, it is expected that the Amazon rainforest will become irreversibly damaged leading to its collapse, and that the complete destruction of coral reefs will be widespread. As these things are already happening, this picture may be optimistic. As for humans, there will be widespread hunger and starvation with up to 5.5 billion people living in regions with large crop losses and another 3 billion people with serious water shortages. If the Amazon rainforest collapses due to severe drought it would result in decreased uptake of CO2 from the soil and vegetation of about 270 billion tons, resulting in an enormous increase in the atmospheric level of CO2. This, of course, would lead to even hotter temperatures with catastrophic results for civilization. A Regional Climate Change Index has been established that estimates the impact of global warming on various regions of the world (Giorgi, 2006). The index is based on four variables that include changes in surface temperature and precipitation in 2080-2099 compared to the period 1960-1979. All regions of the world are affected significantly, but some regions are much more vulnerable than others. The biggest impacts occur in the Mediterranean and northeastern European regions, followed by high-latitude Northern Hemisphere regions and Central America. Central America is the most affected tropical region followed by southern equatorial Africa and southeast Asia. Other prominent mid-latitude regions very vulnerable to global warming are eastern North America and central Asia. It is entirely obvious that we must start curtailing greenhouse gas emissions now, not 5 or 10 or 20 years from now. Keeping the global average temperature anomaly under 2'C will not be easy according to a recent report (Scientific Expert Group Report on Climate Change, 2007). It will require a rapid worldwide reduction in methane, and global CO2 emissions must level off to a concentration not much greater than the present amount by about 2020. Emissions would then have to decline to about a third of that level by 2100. Delaying action will only insure a grim future for our children and grandchildren. If the current generation does not drastically reduce its greenhouse gas emission, then, unfortunately, our grandchildren will get what we deserve. There are three consequences that have not been discussed in previous chapters but could have devastating impacts on humans: food production, health, and the economy. In a sense, all of these topics are interrelated, because they affect each other. Food Production Agriculture is critical to the survival of civilization. Crops feed not only us but also the domestic animals we use for food. Any disruption in food production means a disruption of the economy, government, and health. The increase in CO2 will result in some growth of crops, and rising temperatures will open new areas to crop production at higher latitudes and over longer growing seasons; however, the overall result will be decreased crop production in most parts of the world. A 1993 study of the effects of a doubling of CO2 (550 ppm) above pre-industrial levels shows that there will be substantial decreases in the world food supply (Rosenzweig et al., 1993). In their research they studied the effects of global warming on four crops (wheat, rice, protein feed, and coarse grain) using four scenarios involving various adaptations of crops to temperature change and CO2 abundance. They found that the amount of world food reduction ranged from 1 to 27%. However, the optimistic value of 1% is almost certainly much too low, because it assumed that the amount of degradation would be offset by more growth from "CO2 fertilization." We now know that this is not the case, as explained below and in Chapter 7. The most probable value is a worldwide food reduction between 16 and 27%. These scenarios are based on temperature and CO2 rises that may be too low, as discussed in Chapter 7. However, even a decrease in world food production of 16% would lead to large-scale starvation in many regions of the world. Large-scale experiments called Free-Air Concentration Enrichment have shown that the effects of higher CO2 levels on crop growth is about 50% less than experiments in enclosure studies (Long et al., 2006). This shows that the projections that conclude that rising CO2 will fully offset the losses due to higher temperatures are wrong. The downside of climate change will far outweigh the benefits of increased CO2 and longer growing seasons. One researcher (Prof. Long) from the University of Illinois put it this way: Growing crops much closer to real conditions has shown that increased levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will have roughly half the beneficial effects previously hoped for in the event of climate change. In addition, ground-level ozone, which is also predicted to rise but has not been extensively studied before, has been shown to result in a loss of photosynthesis and 20 per cent reduction in crop yield. Both these results show that we need to seriously re-examine our predictions for future global food production, as they are likely to be far lower than previously estimated. Also, studies in Britain and Denmark show that only a few days of hot temperatures can severely reduce the yield of major food crops such as wheat, soy beans, rice, and groundnuts if they coincide with the flowering of these crops. This suggests that there are certain thresholds above which crops become very vulnerable to climate change. The European heat wave in the summer of 2003 provided a large-scale experiment on the behavior of crops to increased temperatures. Scientists from several European research institutes and universities found that the growth of plants during the heat wave was reduced by nearly a third (Ciais et al., 2005). In Italy, the growth of corn dropped by about 36% while oak and pine had a growth reduction of 30%. In the affected areas of the mid- west and California the summer heat wave of 2006 resulted in a 35% loss of crops, and in California a 15% decline in dairy production due to the heat-caused death of dairy cattle. It has been projected that a 2 °C rise in local temperature will result in a $92 million loss to agriculture in the Yakima Valley of Washington due to the reduction of the snow pack. A 4'C increase will result in a loss of about $163 million. For the first time, the world's grain harvests have fallen below the consumption level for the past four years according to the Earth Policy Institute (Brown, 2003). Furthermore, the shortfall in grain production increased each year, from 16 million tons in 2000 to 93 million tons in 2003. These studies were done in industrialized nations where agricultural practices are the best in the world. In developing nations the impact will be much more severe. It is here that the impact of global warming on crops and domestic animals will be most felt. In general, the world's most crucial staple food crops could fall by as much as one-third because of resistance to flowering and setting of seeds due to rising temperatures. Crop ecologists believe that many crops grown in the tropics are near, or at, their thermal limits. Already research in the Philippines has linked higher night-time temperatures to a reduction in rice yield. It is estimated that for rice, wheat, and corn, the grain yields are likely to decline by 10% for every local 1 °C increase in temperature. With a decreasing availability of food, malnutrition will become more frequent accompanied by damage to the immune system. This will result in a greater susceptibility to spreading diseases. For an extreme rise in global temperature (> 6 'C), it is likely that worldwide crop failures will lead to mass starvation, and political and economic chaos with all their ramifications for civilization.

#### Reprocessing solves warming in two ways:

#### First, reprocessing is key to a revived U.S. clean energy program that provides leadership to win agreements to cut emissions and solve warming.

Roberts 4 (Paul, Energy Expert and Writer for Harpers, The End of Oil, pg. 325-326)

Politically, a new U.S. energy policy would send a powerful message to the rest of the players in the global energy economy. Just as a carbon tax would signal the markets that a new competition had begun, so a progressive, aggressive American energy policy would give a warning to international businesses, many of which now regard the United States as a lucrative dumping ground for older high-carbon technology. It would signal energy producers — companies and states — that they would need to start making investments for a new energy business, with differing demands and product requirements. Above all, a progressive energy policy would not only show trade partners in Japan and Europe that the United States is serious about climate but would give the United States the leverage it needs to force much-needed changes in the Kyoto treaty. With a carbon program and a serious commitment to improve efficiency and develop clean-energy technologies, says one U.S. climate expert, “the United States could really shape a global climate policy. We could basically say to Europe, ‘Here is an American answer to climate that is far better than Kyoto. Here are the practical steps we’re going to take to reduce emissions, far more effectively than your cockamamie Kyoto protocol.”’ Similarly, the United States would finally have the moral credibility to win promises of cooperation from India and China. As James MacKenzie, the former White House energy analyst who now works on climate issues for the Washington-based World Resources Institute, told me, Chinese climate researchers and policymakers know precisely what China must do to begin to deal with emissions but have thus far been able to use U.S. intransigence as an excuse for their own inaction. “Whenever you bring up the question of what the Chinese should be doing about climate, they just smile. They ask, ‘Why should we in China listen to the United States and take all these steps to protect the climate, when the United States won’t take the same steps itself? With a nudge from the United States, argues Chris Flavin, the renewables optimist at World Watch Institute, China could move away from its “destiny” as a dirty coal energy economy. Indeed, given China’s urgent air quality problems, a growing middle class that will demand environmental quality, and a strategic desire to become a high- tech economy, Flavin says, Beijing is essentially already under great domestic pressure to look beyond coal and is already turning toward alternatives — gas, which is in short supply, but also renewables, especially wind, a resource China has in abundance. Once China’s growing expertise in technology and manufacturing and its cheap labor costs are factored in, Flavin says, it has the basis for a large-scale wind industry — something the right push from the West could set in motion. “As China moves forward,” asks Flavin, “is it really likely to do something that no other country has ever done: run a modern, hightech, postindustrial economy on a hundred-year-old energy source?” Flavin, for one, thinks not. During a visit two years ago to lobby reluctant Chinese government officials to invest in renewable energy, Flavin was pleasantly surprised to find in his hotel parking lot a truck owned by NEG Micon, a Danish company that is one of the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturers. Flavin was elated: “At least one leading renewable-energy company, located halfway around the world, is confident enough of its business prospects in China that it now has its own vehicles in Beijing.”

#### Second, only allowing for reprocessing allows for nuclear power to transition to a carbon free economy fast enough to avoid catastrophic warming – best modeling flows aff.

Chakravorty et al. 12 (Ujjayant (Professor and Canada Research Chair, Alberta School of Business and Department of Economics); Bertrand Magne (OECD Environment Directorate, Paris, France); Michel Moreaux (Emeritus Professor and IDEI Researcher, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse), “RESOURCE USE UNDER CLIMATE STABILIZATION: CAN NUCLEAR POWER PROVIDE CLEAN ENERGY?”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2012, RSR)

This paper applies a model with price-induced substitution across resources to examine the role of nuclear power in achieving a climate stabilization target, such as that advocated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It asks an important policy question: is nuclear power a viable carbon-free energy source for the future? If so, then at what cost? The main insight is that nuclear power can help us switch quickly to carbon free energy, and if historical growth rates of nuclear capacity are preserved, the costs of reaching climate stabilization goals decline signiﬁcantly and may therefore be at the lower end of cost estimates that are reported by many studies. However, it is also clear from our results that nuclear is economical anyway, even without environmental regulation. Regulation only plays a major part when fast breeders are available and that too, in the somewhat distant future, towards the end of the century. To some extent, recent increases in efﬁciency in U.S. nuclear power attest to its economic advantages, even in a market with no environmental regulation (Davis and Wolfram 2011). The climate goal of 550 ppm of carbon can be achieved at a surplus cost of about 800 billion dollars, or about 1.3% of current world GDP, if no nuclear expansion is undertaken. Achieving this goal using nuclear power will result in a tripling of the share of world nuclear electricity generation by mid century with welfare gains of about half a trillion dollars (in discounted terms). The cost of providing energy will decrease by about $1.3 trillion or 2% of current world GDP, compared to the case in which the level of nuclear generation is frozen. These estimates of cost savings from nuclear power are signiﬁcant, and unlike in previous studies, are derived from an economic model with an explicit nuclear fuel cycle. However, nuclear power can be cost-effective for about 50 years or so, beyond which period, other technologies are likely to take over, including renewables, clean coal and next generation nuclear technologies that are much more efﬁcient in recycling waste materials. Ultimately, large-scale adoption of nuclear power will be hindered by the rising cost of uranium and the problem of waste disposal. Only signiﬁcant new developments such as the availability of new generation nuclear technology that is able to recycle nuclear waste may lead to a steady state where nuclear energy plays an important role. 31

#### This is especially true now – we need nuclear power in the interim since renewables are not progressing fast enough.

Harvey 12 (Fiona, Environment Correspondent, “Nuclear power is only solution to climate change, says Jeffrey Sachs”, The Guardian, 5-3-12,

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/03/nuclear-power-solution-climate-change>, RSR)

Combating climate change will require an expansion of nuclear power, respected economist Jeffrey Sachs said on Thursday, in remarks that are likely to dismay some sections of the environmental movement. Prof Sachs said atomic energy was needed because it provided a low-carbon source of power, while renewable energy was not making up enough of the world's energy mix and new technologies such as carbon capture and storage were not progressing fast enough. "We won't meet the carbon targets if nuclear is taken off the table," he said. He said coal was likely to continue to be cheaper than renewables and other low-carbon forms of energy, unless the effects of the climate were taken into account.

#### US leadership on nuclear reprocessing leads to a spillover of the technology internationally.

Acton 9 (James, J. associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Survival, Vol. 51, No. 4, “Nuclear Power, Disarmament and Technological Restraint”, RSR)

Thus, not only does reprocessing clearly not help with facilitating take back, but if advanced nuclear states adopt it as a tool for waste management, it will be virtually impossible for them to argue against others doing likewise. Today, waste management is probably the most important driver for reprocessing. Indeed, the Bush administration’s interest in this technology was born out of a desire to stretch the capacity of Yucca Mountain as far as possible. If the United States and others reprocess they will hand a powerful argument to lobbies within a state – typically the nuclear R&D community – that support the development of reprocessing.

### Plan Text

#### Thus the plan: The United States Federal Government should provide a twenty-percent investment tax credit for the deployment of domestic nuclear fuel recycling.

### Solvency

#### Observation Four: Solvency

#### Tax incentives would solve for reprocessing – makes it commercially more desirable

Lagus 5 (Todd, 2005 WISE Intern, University of Minnesota, WISE, “Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Policy Analysis” <http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2005/lagus.pdf>, RSR)

The economic analysis shows that the reprocessing or even the once through nuclear cycle is not yet economically desirable to investors. However, changes in government policies, including environmental regulations already mentioned and economic policies, could improve the competitiveness of both technologies. The University of Chicago nuclear power study analyzes the effects of government involvement in the future of the once through cycle using several different forms of support: loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation, and investment tax credits. Loan guarantees in this case refer to the obligation of the government to repay part of the loan should a utility company not be able to repay. The 2005 Energy Bill, which passed in July 2005, would make advanced nuclear power plants eligible for federal loan guarantees and provide a tax credit for nuclear power production. This would lessen the risks associated with capital costs for investors, and according to the Chicago study, reduce the LCOE for a nuclear reactor by 4 mills/kWh to 6 mills/kWh. The next financial subject, accelerated depreciation, refers to the ability of an investor to utilize the investment tax deductions early on in the lifetime of the payment rather than receive the same deduction each year in a linear fashion. Accelerated depreciation helps investors absorb capital costs, which for nuclear power generation are large. The University of Chicago study calculates a reduction in the LCOE for a 7 year depreciation policy of 3 mills/kWh to 4 mills/kWh. Tax incentives for nuclear power production are the final policies that could make nuclear power and reprocessing more desirable. An investment tax credit of 10 percent would create an LCOE reduction between 6 mills/kWh and 8 mills/kWh, while a 20 percent credit could create cost reductions between 9 mills/kWh and 13 mills/kWh. 39 Production tax credits on a per kWh basis may also be used. Since reprocessing and the once through cycle are not appreciably different for the price, it is sufficient to assume 12 that similar effects for all three of these government policies would occur with policies applied to reprocessing. While it is no secret that monetary incentives would help the nuclear reprocessing investments, there is still the question of whether or not the government should provide economic support to the industry. As with any government funding, it is politically important not to be viewed by other energy generation industries, i.e. gas and coal, as favoring nuclear power over other sources. Given the recent concerns for global warming, tax incentives and loan guarantees for nuclear technologies seem like a realistic option especially in the absence of emission regulations. Accelerated depreciation also is an unobtrusive option that could help the industry by easing capital costs.

#### Government investment key – necessary to mitigate risks from government regulations.

Selyukh 10 (Alina, Staff Writer, “Nuclear waste issue could be solved, if...”, 8-17-10, Reuters,

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/17/us-nuclear-waste-recycling-idUSTRE67G0NM20100817>, RSR)

Since the U.S. agency declared spent fuel reprocessing too costly, U.S. research into new technologies has slowed. President George W. Bush offered federal backing for nuclear waste management alternatives, but over the years the policy has meandered and had few incentives to lure companies, said Steven Kraft, senior director of used-fuel management at the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's trade organization. Being able to burn through rather inexpensive uranium to produce energy, companies are wary of investing millions into recycling technology that may go against the national policy. Still, industry support for the ideas is strong, if not for the procedure itself then for allowing the market -- not the government -- to determine its cost-effectiveness and fate. Duke Energy, which operates seven nuclear plants, would support nuclear recycling if there was a cost-effective national policy, spokeswoman Rita Sipe said. GE Hitachi has proposed a new generation of fast reactors that, they say, could return to the grid up to 99 percent of energy contained in the uranium, compared to recovering 2 or 3 percent from a common light water reactor. But they want federal support for more research and, ultimately, commercialization of the technology, said chief consulting engineer Erik Loewen. That support, in essence, would have to come in a form of subsidies such as cost sharing or loan guarantees, said Jack Spencer, nuclear energy policy research fellow at the Heritage Foundation think tank. "What the industry needs... is something to mitigate government-imposed risks," he said of the regulatory regime.

#### Government investment necessary – provides appropriate risk mitigation and shortens the timeframe for completion.

IAEA 8 (International Atomic Energy Agency, “Spent Fuel Reprocessing Options”, August 2008, RSR)

With the expected high costs and significant risks involved in constructing new nuclear facilities, e.g., reprocessing facilities, the impact of various ownership options need to be considered. These options include government funding, regulated funding, private funding, and combinations of public and private funding. These different funding approaches may significantly impact the costs of fuel cycle services. Given the very long time frames associated with building reprocessing facilities, there exist risks other than technological or economic, which need to be dealt with. These include evolving government policy, public and political acceptance, and licensing risks. As a result, private investors are unlikely to provide capital unless the initial high risks factors are mitigated through appropriate risk sharing agreements (e.g., loan guarantees, equity protection plans, tax credits, etc.) with government entities.

## 2AC

### T

#### We meet – We specify nuclear fuel recycling.

#### Nuclear fuel recycling is converting nuclear fuel into energy.

World Nuclear Association 12 [Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf69.html]

Used nuclear fuel has long been reprocessed to extract fissile materials for recycling and to reduce the volume of high-level wastes. ¶ New reprocessing technologies are being developed to be deployed in conjunction with fast neutron reactors which will burn all long-lived actinides. ¶ A significant amount of plutonium recovered from used fuel is currently recycled into MOX fuel; a small amount of recovered uranium is recycled. ¶ A key, nearly unique, characteristic of nuclear energy is that used fuel may be reprocessed to recover fissile and fertile materials in order to provide fresh fuel for existing and future nuclear power plants. Several European countries, Russia and Japan have had a policy to reprocess used nuclear fuel, although government policies in many other countries have not yet addressed the various aspects of reprocessing.¶ Over the last 50 years the principal reason for reprocessing used fuel has been to recover unused uranium and plutonium in the used fuel elements and thereby close the fuel cycle, gaining some 25% more energy from the original uranium in the process and thus contributing to energy security. A secondary reason is to reduce the volume of material to be disposed of as high-level waste to about one fifth. In addition, the level of radioactivity in the waste from reprocessing is much smaller and after about 100 years falls much more rapidly than in used fuel itself.¶

#### We’ll defend all types of recycling. Solves limits offense because they can PIC out of any type of reprocessing ie PUREX or MOX.

#### Solves their ground arguments because we provide them links and arguments against all types of reprocessing.

#### Don’t vote on potential abuse.

#### Competing interpretations are bad: Race to the bottom: they’re just trying to limit out one more case

#### Prefer reasonability: as long as we’re reasonably topical, there’s no reason to pull the trigger. Don’t vote on potential abuse.

### Warming

#### The rate of climate change prevents adaptation.

Romm, Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress, ‘7

[Joseph, Aug 29, “Hurricane Katrina and the Myth of Global Warming Adaptation,” <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2007/08/29/201815/hurricane-katrina-and-the-myth-of-global-warming-adaptation/>, RSR]

If we won’t adapt to the realities of having one city below sea level in hurricane alley, what are the chances we are going to adapt to the realities of having all our great Gulf and Atlantic Coast cities at risk for the same fate as New Orleans — since sea level from climate change will ultimately put many cities, like Miami, below sea level? And just how do you adapt to sea levels rising 6 to 12 inches a decade for centuries, which well may be our fate by 2100 if we don’t reverse greenhouse gas emissions trends soon. Climate change driven by humans GHGs is already happening much faster than past climate change from natural causes — and it is accelerating.

#### Turn – weeds – Co2 leads to weeds – tanks agriculture

Ziska ‘7[Lewis Ziska, PhD, Principal investigator at United States Department of Agriculture
Agricultural Research Service Alternate Crop and Systems Lab. “Climate change impact on weeds” http://www.climateandfarming.org/pdfs/FactSheets/III.1Weeds.pdf]

Weeds have a greater genetic diversity than crops. Consequently, if a resource (light, water, nutrients or carbon dioxide) changes within the environment, it is more likely that weeds will show a greater growth and reproductive response. It can be argued that many weed species have the C4 photosynthetic pathway and therefore will show a smaller response to atmospheric CO2 relative to C3 crops. However, this argument does not consider the range of available C3 and C4 weeds present in any agronomic environment. That is, at present, the U.S. has a total of 46 major crops; but, over 410 “troublesome” weed species (both C3 and C4) associated with those crops (Bridges 1992). Hence, if a C4 weed species does not respond, it is likely that a C3 weed species will. In addition, many growers recognize that the worst weeds for a given crop are similar in growth habit or photosynthetic pathway; indeed, they are often the same uncultivated or “wild” species, e.g. oat and wild oat, sorghum and shattercane, rice and red rice. To date, for all weed/crop competition studies where the photosynthetic pathway is the same, weed growth is favored as CO2 is increased (Table 1, Ziska and Runion, In Press). In addition to agronomic weeds, there is an additional category of plants that are considered “noxious” or “invasive” weeds. These are plants, usually non-native whose introduction results in wide-spread economic or environmental consequences (e.g. kudzu). Many of these weeds reproduce by vegetative means (roots, stolons, etc.) and recent evidence indicates that as a group, these weeds may show a strong response to recent increases in atmospheric CO2 (Ziska and George 2004). How rising CO2 would contribute to the success of these weeds in situ however, is still unclear. Overall, the data that are available on the response of weeds and changes in weed ecology are limited. Additional details, particularly with respect to interactions with other environmental variables (e.g. nutrient availability, precipitation and temperature) are also needed.

#### Turn – pollution leads to ozone – tanks ag – outweighs any benefit from CO2

Monbiot ‘7[George, Professor @ Oxford Brookes University, Heat: How to Stop the Planet from Burning, pg. 7]

But now, I am sorry to say, it seems that I might have been right, though for the wrong reasons. In late 2005, a study published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society alleged that the yield predictions for temperate countries were 'over optimistic'. The authors had blown carbon dioxide and ozone, in concentrations roughly equivalent to those expected later this century, over crops in the open air. They discovered that the plants didn't respond as they were supposed to: the extra carbon dioxide did not fertilize them as much as the researchers predicted, and the **ozone reduced their yields** by 20 per cent." Ozone levels are rising in the rich nations by between 1 and 2 per cent a year, as a result of sunlight interacting with pollution from cars, planes and power stations. The levels happen to be highest in the places where crop yields were expected to rise: western Europe, the midwest and eastern US and eastern China. The expected ozone increase in China will cause maize, rice and soybean production to fall by over 30 per cent by 2020, These reductions in yield, if real, arc enough to **cancel out the effects** of both higher temperatures and higher carbon dioxide concentrations.

#### Reprocessing would remove the waste problem – the waste we currently store can be reused

Bastin 8 (Clinton, Former Chemical Engineer at the Atomic Energy Commission, 21st Century Science and Technology, “We Need to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Fuel, And Can Do It Safely, At Reasonable Cost”, 2008, [http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles%202008/ Summer\_2008/Reprocessing.pdf](http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles%202008/Summer_2008/Reprocessing.pdf), RSR)

The concept of used nuclear fuel as “nuclear waste” is a fiction created by the opponents of nuclear energy. Used nuclear fuel isn’t waste at all, but a renewable resource that can be reprocessed into new nuclear fuel and valuable isotopes. When we entered the nuclear age, the great promise of nuclear energy wasitsrenewability, making it an inexpensive and efficient way to produce electricity. It was assumed that the nations making use of nuclear energy would reprocess their spent fuel, completing the nuclear fuel cycle by recycling the nuclear fuel after it was burned in a reactor, to extract the 95 to 99 percent of unused uranium in it that can be turned into new fuel. This means that if the United States buries its 70,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, we would be wasting 66,000 metric tons of uranium-28, which could be used to make new fuel. In addition, we would be wasting about 1,200 metric tons of fissile uranium-25 and plutonium-29, which can also be burned as fuel. Because of the high energy density in the nucleus, this relatively small amount of U.S. spent fuel (it would fit in one small house) is equivalent in energy to about 20 percent of the U.S. oil reserves. About 96 percent of the spent fuel the United States is now storing can be turned into new fuel. The 4 percent of the socalled waste that remains—2,500 metric tons—consists of highly radioactive materials, but these are also usable. There are about 80 tons each of cesium-17 and strontium-90 that could be separated out for use in medical applications, such as sterilization of medical supplies. Using isotope separation techniques, and fast-neutron bombardment for transmutation (technologies that the United States pioneered but now refuses to develop), we could separate out all sorts of isotopes, like americium, which is used in smoke detectors, or isotopes used in medical testing and treatment. Right now, the United Statesmust import 90 percent of its medical isotopes, used in 40,000 medical procedures daily. The diagram shows a closed nuclear fuel cycle. At present, the United States has no reprocessing, and stores spent fuel in pools or dry storage at nuclear plants. Existing nuclear reactors use only about 1 percent of the total energy value in uranium resources; fast reactors with fuel recycle would use essentially 100 percent, burning up all of the uranium and actinides, the long-lived fission products. In a properly managed and safeguarded system, the plutonium produced in fast reactors would remain in its spent fuel until needed for recycle.Thus, there need be no excess buildup of accessible plutonium. The plutonium could also be fabricated directly into new reactor fuel assemblies to be burned in nuclear plants.

#### Rhetoric of apocalypse is key to producing substantive change and generating agency – studies prove

Veldman 12 (Robin Globus, phd candidate B.A and M.A, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists” in Ethics & the Environment 17.1.)

As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 17(1) 2012 using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, humancaused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.

### Waste

#### Proliferation concerns are empirically denied, and purification of spent fuel is impractical.

Klein, Associate Director of The Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin, 11 (Dale, Spent Nuclear Fuel Is An Abundant Source of Energy, 21st Century Science & Technology, 21 February 2011, http://www.21stcenturysciencetech.com/Articles\_2011/Spring-2011/Spent\_Nuclear\_Energy.pdf, da 8-23-12)

Now, more than three decades later, six nations have major ¶ ¶ commitments to reprocessing their spent fuel. The arguments ¶ ¶ against reprocessing as a proliferation concern are not compelling and obviously, other nations interested in extracting ¶ ¶ the energy value from their spent fuel do not align with U.S. ¶ ¶ policy.¶ ¶ A typical commercial nuclear power reactor will generate ¶ ¶ about 20 tonnes of spent fuel every year. Contained in that ¶ ¶ spent fuel is about 200 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium. ¶ ¶ Often misunderstood, or misrepresented by opponents to recycling, the isotopic mixture of reactor-grade plutonium makes it ¶ ¶ unsuitable for nuclear weapons.¶ ¶ Weapons-grade plutonium is approximately 95 percent Pu-¶ ¶ 239, whereas reactor-grade is only about 50 percent Pu-239. ¶ ¶ The cost and complexity of the technologies required to purify ¶ ¶ reactor grade to weapons grade makes it impractical for use in ¶ ¶ nuclear weapons.¶ ¶ In fact, we know of, or strongly believe, that nine nations ¶ ¶ have developed nuclear weapons. Looking historically at the ¶ ¶ origins of the fissile materials used to develop those weapons, we know that the sources were either through enrichment of uranium or with the use of graphite or heavy-water-moderated production reactors, but not commercial ¶ ¶ reactors.¶ ¶ Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are believed to have ¶ ¶ produced weapons-grade plutonium from the diversion of ¶ ¶ their heavy water research reactors to irradiate target materials. No nation has ever tried to produce nuclear weapons ¶ ¶ from the type of spent fuel discharged by commercial power ¶ ¶ reactors.

#### Your evidence assumes status quo reprocessing techniques—newer techniques cut waste in half

Lee, 2010 Wise Intern at the American Nuclear Society, ‘10

[Nathan, WISE, “Sustainability Of U.S. Nuclear Energy: Waste Management And¶ The Question Of Reprocessing”, 2010,

<http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2010/NathanLeeWISE2010.pdf>, RSR]

The near-term waste burden of the once-through cycle in the United States is considerable but effectively managed through contained pool and dry cask storage. There is consensus that this strategy is sustainable at least until midcentury. 29 On the other hand, there has been substantial criticism of the generation and management of low-level waste from PUREX reprocessing plants abroad. As Table 1 shows, the total waste volume increases for the conventional Pu recycle scheme used today. However, implementation of the full actinide recycle would cut total waste volume nearly in half. 30

### PRISM Reactor PIC

#### Perm: do both.

#### MOX is a net benefit to the permutation.

#### PMDA cooperation coming now ---- MOX fuel is key

DTRIP ’12

(Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program, “Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement”, 2012, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/tic/synopses/pmda.aspx)

The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), [long title: Agreement Between the Government of The United States Of America and the Government of The Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as no Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation] is designed to make arms reductions irreversible by ensuring that the United States and Russia transparently dispose of weapons-grade plutonium from their respective defense programs and, thereby, prevent the plutonium from ever being reused for weapons or any other military purpose. Under the PMDA the United States and Russia each agreed to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium by converting it into fuel for use in civil reactors that produce electricity. Combined, this represents enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. The PMDA also provides that additional weapons-grade plutonium declared in excess as arms reductions go forward should be disposed of under the same or comparable transparency terms. In 2006, Russia announced its nuclear energy strategy. This strategy was incompatible with the 2000 PMDA. In 2007, Russia provided clarification of its preferred approach to the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. This clarification served as the basis for updating the PMDA via the protocol signed on April 13, 2010 by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The 2010 protocol enables each party to proceed with completing and operating the facilities needed to depose of weapons-grade plutonium. These facilities will use the plutonium to produce electricity for civilian purposes. In December 2010, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy and the Russian Director General for the State Corporation "Rosatom” issued the Joint Statement on the Results of the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group Meeting, including the intent to create milestones by February 2011 for bringing the PMDA into force. On May 20, 2011, Russia's State Duma ratified the PMDA and its Protocols. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the amendments to the PMDA on June 7, 2011. On July 13, 2011, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged diplomatic notes in Washington, D.C., bringing the PMDA and its Protocols into force. Weapons-grade plutonium, unlike weapons-grade uranium, cannot be blended with other materials to make it unusable in weapons. However, weapons-grade plutonium can be fabricated into mixed oxide uranium-plutonium (MOX) fuel and irradiated in civil nuclear power reactors to produce electricity. This irradiation results in spent fuel – a form that is not usable for weapons or other military purposes. The protocol also prohibits spent fuel from being changed in the future unless it is subject to agreed international monitoring measures and is used only for civilian purposes. Both Russia and the United States plan to begin disposition activities by 2018. Potential Facility Impacts Key Verification Measures To provide confidence that the Parties are disposing of weapons-grade plutonium in accordance with the terms and conditions of the amended PMDA, disposition activities on both sides will be subject to monitoring and on-site inspection. The Parties met in the PMDA Joint Consultative Commission to clarify key elements of the PMDA’s compliance verification regime. Next steps include consulting with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and negotiating an agreement whereby the IAEA will monitor the Party’s disposition activities and conduct on-site inspections to verify compliance with the PMDA. In August 2010, Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov submitted a joint request to IAEA Director General Amano for consultation regarding an agreement whereby the IAEA will monitor the Party’s disposition activities and conduct on-site inspections to verify compliance with the PMDA. As of July 2012, the two countries and the IAEA were making progress on appropriate IAEA verification measures for each country’s disposition program. back to top Current Activities Recent Developments The United States is expected to provide $400 million in assistance for the disposal of surplus Russian plutonium, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry. Moscow will fund the remaining balance, setting aside an estimated $3.5 billion for the effort. Next, the United States and Russia must reach an agreement on milestones for allocation of the U.S. contribution. To implement the PMDA in the United States, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is building a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. The facility will provide a capability to disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the resulting plutonium into a form suitable to be made into MOX fuel. A Waste Solidification Building will handle the waste resulting from pit disassembly and MOX operations. When operational, the facility will be capable of turning 3.5 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium into MOX fuel assemblies annually. The facility will be licensed for 20 years, with operations to continue into the 2030s. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is overseeing construction of the facility. It will be a hardened facility, similar to a nuclear reactor. As of June 2012, the MOX facility is scheduled to begin operation in 2016 and is more than 60 percent complete. Since construction began in 2007, more than 19,000 tons of rebar have been installed and over 118,000 cubic yards of concrete have been placed. More than 400,000 feet of process piping and nearly six million feet of electrical cable are currently being installed, while installation of the process tanks is 90 percent complete. Eleven of the sixteen auxiliary buildings needed to support construction and operation of the MOX facility have been finished, including a new electrical substation which was completed in September 2010.

#### Plutonium cooperation solves Russian relations

Luongo ‘7 -- executive director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council

(Kenneth N., “Improving U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cooperation”, Partnership for Global Security, 2007, <http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/publications/Articles%20and%20Commentary/improving_nuc_coop.html>)

Expediting fissile material disposition and elimination. Although programs that support the disposal of excess fissile materials in the United States and Russia have shown progress, there is room, and need, for improvement. The Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase agreement could be expanded to handle more than the current allotment of 500 metric tons. The plutonium disposition program, now in political limbo, could be put back on track so that implementation can proceed as scheduled. In addition, the United States and Russia should begin to determine how much more plutonium is excess and could be eliminated. Ending plutonium production in Russia. Continuing plutonium production for both military and commercial purposes adds to the already significant burden of improving nuclear material security in Russia. Steps should be taken to end this production expeditiously. Russia has three remaining plutonium-producing reactors, which currently produce approximately 1.5 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium per year. However, the reactors also provide heat and energy for surrounding towns, and in order to shut them down, other energy sources must be provided. In 2000, Congress prohibited the use of funds to build alternative fossil-fuel energy plants at these sites, the method preferred by both Russia and the United States for replacing the nuclear plants. The estimated cost of the new plants is on the order of $420 million. Congress should lift its prohibition and provide funding for building the replacement plants. Also, Congress should provide funds to enable the United States and Russia to continue their work on an inventory of Russia's plutonium production. Finally, Congress should authorize and fund incentives to help end plutonium reprocessing in Russia. In 2000, program officials requested about $50 million for a set of projects to provide Russia with an incentive to end its continued separation of plutonium from spent fuel. But Congress approved only $23 million, and the Bush administration's proposed budget eliminated all funding. These programs should be reconstituted. There is no question that U.S.-Russian nuclear relations need to be adapted to the 21st century. The foundation for this transition has been laid by the endurance and successes of the cooperative security agenda. Today, each country knows much more about the operation of the other's weapons facilities. Technical experts cooperate on topics that were once taboo. And the most secretive weapons scientists in both nations have become collaborators on efforts to protect international security. Both nations must now recognize that more progress is needed and that it can be built on this *foundation* of achievement--if, in fact, elimination of the last vestiges of Cold War nuclear competition and the development of effective cooperation in fighting future threats is what the United States and Russia truly seek.

#### Effective relations solve nuclear war

Lukyanov ’11

(Fyodor, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Politics magazine, “Nuclear destruction remains the basis of relations”, The Telegraph, 1-5-2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/8241050/Nuclear-destruction-remains-the-basis-of-Russia-US-relations.html)

When President Dmitry Medvedev warned in his latest state-of-the-nation address that a new arms race could begin in the next decade, the hall erupted in applause. No wonder. For many of the Russian senators in the audience, that term calls to mind their younger years, something pleasant in and of itself. Added to which many people on both sides of the Atlantic, it seems, sorely miss those “good old days” when everything was clear: two worlds, two systems, and explicit rules of the game.¶ One finds oneself thinking of the advantages of a systemic confrontation, given the political and legal free-for-all into which the planet has been sinking ever since.¶ But reminiscences aside, what did the president mean? And we should consider that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also said in his recent interview with Larry King that an arms race would lead not only to the failure of the anti-missile defence shield but also to the non-ratification of Start II. The latter is doubtful: that agreement is not of such calibre. But as for the anti-missile defences, Moscow’s logic is understandable.¶ The question remains: can Russia and the US break the vicious circle of mutual nuclear containment, or will this type of relationship, frankly absurd today, be preserved in future?¶ Whatever Moscow and Washington do, the material and technological basis of their relations remains not simply restraint, but Mutually Assured Destruction. Another use for the vast arsenals they amassed up to the late Eighties simply does not exist. No international problem requires such a quantity of nuclear charges and missiles. The political logic of that period has long since lost its force; the whole world has changed. But you can’t argue with weapons: the logic of arsenals still dictates, no matter how often Russia and the United States reiterate that they no longer see each other as adversaries.¶ A quick liquidation of stockpiles will not be achieved. First of all, strategic nuclear forces are mainly political weapons and a matter of status. No one will simply give these up. This is especially true of Russia, which no longer has any other features of a superpower. And, judging by discussions underway in Washington, idealists there are being squeezed on all sides, too.¶ Second, one needs at the very least a qualitatively different level of trust between Russia and the United States; the first shoots that appeared during the “reset” may very soon be trampled.¶ And finally, the time when these two giants set the tone in the nuclear sphere has long since past. Proliferation goes on, quietly. China’s nuclear arsenal, though only a fraction of Russia’s and America’s, is becoming an increasingly important factor in that country’s growing influence. Neither Washington nor Moscow can allow the other to be in the same “league” with Beijing because then the counterweights to its influence would be even less.¶ Nevertheless, the needlessness of assured destruction is obvious, and this situation must be somehow overcome. The only way is a gradual rapprochement in the strategic sphere which will make the nuclear containment of Russia and the United States an anachronism. And for this, joint work on anti-missile defences would be ideal. If this is undertaken in earnest, sooner or later it will become apparent that missiles aimed at each other are patently absurd given that the “adversaries” are building a joint shield. This is a long, hard road, the success of which, though not guaranteed, is none the less possible. Especially when one realises the real threats facing both countries in the 21st century.¶ On the other hand, it’s obvious what will happen if, in the sphere of anti-missile defence, nothing comes together and they each go their own way. In that case, the old type of relations will inevitably recur since that same nuclear rubicon will be preserved. An American missile defence system would be built against any other country possessing missile potential, including, of course, Russia – even if Russia were not the main object. Moscow would then automatically begin searching for ways of overcoming that anti-missile shield.¶ No one will abolish mutual nuclear deterrence as the basis of balance so long as the two nuclear superpowers are not engaged in a common cause. All of this goes beyond the bounds of rational argument, but the burden of arsenals aimed at one another will continue to return us to the confrontation of 30 years ago, even if in a farcical form.¶ One must not forget that all this is a game of nerves. These gigantic arsenals are inapplicable; the anti-missile system is virtual since most likely it will never be created. The paradox is that the political effect of the idea of an anti-missile shield is more than real since it touches the heart of the problem of strategic stability.¶ To imagine an arms race of the classic kind that existed in the latter half of the 20th century is impossible. The entire developed world is too concerned with budget deficits and national debt: in reality these problems represent a far greater threat to stability than do any classic threats. True, in that situation nuclear weapons regain the significance they seemed to be losing. Meanwhile, Nato’s just-published strategic conception clearly states that nuclear weapons, primarily American, are that alliance’s supreme guarantee of security. So say goodbye to a non-nuclear world. And in the United States, where only recently there was talk of investing in hi-tech conventional weapons of a new generation, cost estimates now show that preserving the nuclear component would be cheaper.¶ Be that as it may, anti-missile defence represents a fork in the road: one way leads to a new system of relations between Russia and the United States, with both sides ceasing to view the other as a strategic threat; the other leads back to a model of the Cold War – albeit a wittingly senseless one.

#### Doesn’t solve warming – specifically need all recycling technology because we need to reuse the waste to generate electricity via nuclear power – that’s 1AC Chakravorty.

#### Doesn’t solve the Aff – the industry needs a strong signal to provide the certainty to invest – picking and choosing gives them political anxieties – that’s Selyukh.

#### Doesn’t solve the Aff – IFR’s aren’t operational yet. Need PUREX and MOX in the interim. Significant action by 2020 is key to solve warming – that’s Peters.

#### **Fast reactor technology is too far away**

Green, Staff Writer, ‘9

[Jim, “Nuclear Weapons and 'Fourth Generation' Reactors”, Friends of the Earth Australia, July

<http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/g4nw>, RSR]

Complete IFR systems don't exist. Fast neutron reactors exist but experience is limited and they have had a troubled history. The pyroprocessing and waste transmutation technologies intended to operate as part of IFR systems are some distance from being mature. But even if the technologies were fully developed and successfully integrated, IFRs would still fail a crucial test − they can too easily be used to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

### REM DA

#### No shortage of rare earth metals – other countries fill in.

McGrath, Science Writer, ‘12

[Matt, “Asian countries challenge China on rare earth minerals”, BBC News, 6-20-12,

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-18508692>, RSR]

And in Vietnam there are now projects underway in several countries to improve the exploitation of rare elements that are still crucial for the manufacture of batteries, magnets, mobile phones and other devices. "There's no shortage of rare earth ore at all and there won't be for several centuries at minimum," Tim Worstall told BBC News. "There is a shortage of the processing capacity to turn those ores into the individual rare elements but that is also being addressed. Several commentators expect that in the next few years, the current shortage of the elements will become a glut. Tim Worstall says that the situation is about to change dramatically. "I can think of three specific projects that I know that are financed and in the next two to three years will supply about 40% of the world market. I think the whole question becomes irrelevant as we get more non-Chinese supplies."

#### REE mining and supply increasing- California mountain pass and other new mines outside US prevents bottle neck

Burnett 12

[H.Sterling, PhD Applied Philosophy, Senior Fellow and lead analyst of the National Center for Policy Analysis' E-Team -- one of the largest collections of energy and environmental policy experts and scientists, “Finding Sources of Rare Earths beyond China,”]

Mountain Pass: An American Rare Earth Mine. California’s Mountain Pass, the only mine in America dedicated to rare earths, closed in 2002 due to environmental problems and low prices. After spending an estimated $500 million on state-of-the-art equipment and significant environmental upgrades, it has reopened under new management.9 Molycorp, the owner, will mine only a handful of rare earth minerals, but it hopes to produce 20,000 tons per year by 2012. By contrast, China produced 124,000 tons of rare earths in 2009.¶ Mountain Pass formerly produced rare earths from the tailings of historical rare earth operations. Molycorp previously estimated Mountain Pass contained more than 2.24 billion pounds of rare oxides. However, based on mining fresh ore and new exploratory drilling, Molycorp now estimates there are 36 percent more reserves — a total of 2.94 billion pounds. The company says it hopes to increase production to 40,000 tons of rare earths per year in the near future.10¶ Globally, the number of new projects to explore for and develop rare earths has exploded in recent years. As of April 2012, Hatch found that 429 rare earth projects outside of China and India were being developed by 261 different companies in 37 different countries.11¶ Clearly, not all projects are equal. Some are being developed based on a handful of samples, while others have proven mineral reserves. There will never be mineral-resource estimates for most of these projects, and even fewer will become profitable ventures. The number and diversity, however, indicates that the so-called “rare earths crisis” is theoretically solvable.¶ Absent government ownership or funding, potential mineral resources must be estimated before these projects can be funded. Of the 429 projects mentioned above, as of April 2012, 36 projects have been either been formally defined as a mineral resource or reserve under standard industry guidelines, or were previously mined.12 These rare earth projects are most likely to become productive. The 36 projects include12 operations in Canada, seven in Sub-Saharan Africa, six in Australia, four in the United States, three in Greenland, and one each in Sweden, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Brazil.¶ These operations, plus new mines in China and India, will provide the new supplies of rare earths needed for critical industries.

#### Increased rare earth metal demand is key to the Chinese economy.

China Daily, ‘12

[“Policies of China's rare earth industry”, 6-21-12,

<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-06/21/content_15515969.htm>, RSR]

The market environment is gradually improving as China is constantly expediting reform in the rare earth industry, promoting the development of a market system featuring diversified investment, independent decision-making by businesses and pricing according to supply and demand. In recent years, investment in China's rare earth industry has experienced rapid growth, the market has been constantly expanded, state-owned, privately owned and foreign-invested sectors coexist, and the value of the rare earth metal market is approaching 100 billion yuan. The market order in this sector is gradually improving, and progressive development is being made in the merger and reorganization of businesses. The old picture of a "small, scattered, and disorderly" rare earth industry has vanished. Scientific and technological level has improved further. After many years of development, China has established a relatively complete R&D system, pioneered numerous technologies of international advanced levels in rare earth mining and dressing, smelting, separating, etc., and its unique mining and dressing processes and advanced separating techniques have laid a solid foundation for efficient exploitation and utilization of rare earth resources. The rare earth new materials industry has experienced steady development, and industrialization has been achieved in using rare earths to produce permanent-magnet, luminescent, hydrogen-storage, and catalytic materials, and other new materials, providing support for the restructuring and upgrading of traditional industries, and the development of emerging industries of strategic importance. The rapid development of China's rare earth industry has not only satisfied domestic demand for economic and social development, but also made important contributions to the world's rare earth supply. For many years, China has been faithfully fulfilling its pledges upon its accession to the WTO, honoring the WTO rules, and promoting fair trade in rare earths. Currently, China supplies over 90 percent of the global market rare earth needs with 23 percent of the world's total reserves, its output of permanent-magnet, luminescent, hydrogen-storage and polishing materials, which use rare earths as raw materials, accounts for more than 70 percent of the world's total, and China-produced rare earth materials, parts and components, as well as rare earth end products, such as energy-saving lamps, special and small electric motors and NiMH batteries, satisfied the development needs of high-tech industries of other countries, especially those of the developed countries.

#### Chinese economic collapse leads to nuclear war.

Yee, Associate Professor of Government @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Storey, Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies, ‘2

[Herbert and Ian, China Threat: Perception, Myths, and Reality, p. 5]

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a china threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbounng countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented china could also result in another nightmare scenario — nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

#### No Senkaku conflict.

Business Pundit 10

[9/13, “Why China-Japan Spat Won’t Lead to War,” http://www.businesspundit.com/why-china-japan-spat-wont-lead-to-war/, AJ]

Last Tuesday, a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese coast guard boats near the tiny Diaoyutai Islands (as they’re known to Taiwan. China calls them the Diaoyu. Japan calls them the Senkaku. All three countries claim them as their own.) Japan took the captain and crew of the fishing boat hostage. It released the crew today, but the captain and boat remain in custody, pending a Japanese investigation. The arrests underline an ongoing power struggle between the two Asian superpowers, with China increasingly on the offensive. But, according to the Global Post’s Jonathan Adams, China and Japan are too economically interdependent to risk a full-scale conflict: But a serious military showdown is unlikely, for many reasons. Perhaps the most important is the unprecedented economic ties between East Asia’s two big powers. In 2007, China surpassed the U.S. as Japan’s top economic partner. Since then, the two countries haven’t looked back: Two-way trade hit a record of nearly $140 billion in the first half of this year, a 34.5 percent jump from the same period last year, according to Japanese government figures. Japan’s exports to China are rising even faster than its imports, due to rising Chinese consumption that shows China’s increased importance as a market, not just the world’s factory. All of which suggests that Japan has a strong interest in resolving the current spat quickly, and, to the extent possible, to Beijing’s satisfaction.

### Heidegger

#### Our interpretation is that debate should be a question of the aff plan versus a competitive policy option or the status quo.

#### This is key to ground and predictablity – infinite number of possible kritik alternatives or things the negative could reject explodes the research burden. That’s a voting issue.

#### Their infatuation with ontology is politically debilitating – focusing on ontology divests politics of its emancipatory potential and devolves into a self-justifying cycle of never-ending critique.

Yar, Ph.D in the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University, 2k

[Majid, “Arendt's Heideggerianism: Contours of a `Postmetaphysical' Political Theory?,” Cultural Values, Volume 4, Issue 1, January, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Complete]

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [2] Arendt's pronounceraent at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos.[20] The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.[21]

#### Case outweighs: Let beings be allows waste currently stored on-site that culminates in extinction. Ontological concerns of Being are irrelevant in a world without Beings. Our impacts come first because thoughts about thinking are impossible without people to think them.

#### Permutation do both: Heideggerian releasement is an affirmative argument: we can establish a free relation to technology through thinking, so the action of the plan is not implicated by their link.

Godzinski 5(Ronald Jr., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, “(En)Framing Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology,” Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1, humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html)

In a related vein, the previous claim that everything within the natural world gives itself over to us, as standing-reserve is, for Heidegger, a phenomenological claim. As a purely phenomenological claim, Heidegger is not making an evaluative assertion about the status of modern technology and our comportment toward things that are treated as standing-reserve. Perhaps following the regressive method that Husserl used in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Heidegger presents us with a purely descriptive account of modern technology that seems to be value neutral. In truth, he acknowledges that technology is not intrinsically dangerous or evil.[17](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#17) Even Heidegger’s infamous “Memorial Address”[18](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#18) supports this idea:¶ For all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil.[19](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#19) ¶ When understood within this particular context, Heidegger is neither praising nor demonizing modern technology. Of course the same would have to be said about technological objects that were purported to be intrinsically good, as well. Hence, the potential value that any technical device might have would be contingent upon its context of use. From a Heideggerian standpoint, it would be inappropriate to claim that any technical device is intrinsically good or evil.[20](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#20) ¶ In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger makes the phenomenological observation that we master nature because we respond to nature’s call to requisition it. We do this primarily because this is how we have been *called* by Being. We use things as standing-reserve since they give themselves as standing-reserve—everything gives itself to be used. Even when we are not openly trying to master nature, Heidegger would nonetheless contend that we are still responding to its call. The revealing is not something that we do strictly on our own accord, without first hearing nature’s call. In this sense, we cannot be held accountable for modern technology, since this is something that just happens in the context of western culture: ¶ When man…reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call of unconcealment even when he contradicts it. Thus when man, investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve. Modern technology as an ordering revealing is, then, no merely human doing.[21](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#21) ¶ The challenge which directs us to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve, is nothing other than what Heidegger calls “enframing” [*Gestell*].[22](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#22) Enframing, or *Gestell*, is the essence of modern technology. From Heidegger’s perspective, enframing is the way in which truth reveals itself as standing-reserve. We simply cannot avoid its influence or sway. One is already in a relationship with it, so it is not a matter of whether or not I will respond to it. Rather, it is a matter of how I will respond to it. More importantly, our response to the challenge that enframing emits, is neither completely predetermined nor free.¶ Heidegger recognizes that an authentic notion of freedom will be open to the essencing of technology. Thus, a genuine and free relationship to technology will be one that is open to the essencing of technology. This type of openness to the presencing of technology is called Gelassenheit, or releasement:¶ We can use technical devices, and yet with the proper use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them at any time…. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature…. I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses “yes” and at the same time “no,” by an old word, *releasement toward things*.[23](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#23) ¶ In the movement of Gelassenheit, one enters into a free relationship with technology which is not founded upon domination and mastery.[24](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#24) On the contrary, an authentic relationship to technology is one that is simply beyond our control.[25](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#25) Paradoxically, a relationship which is exemplified by releasement continually uses things as standing-reserve, while avoiding the danger of being taken as standing-reserve, although Heidegger certainly keeps a watchful eye out for the ultimate danger that rests within the ordering of standing-reserve. That is, if we, ourselves, get ordered or dominated by the things that we in turn are trying to order and dominate, then we will encounter the danger, to the extent that the sending or presencing of Being gets closed off and concealed from us.[26](http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/godzinski.html#26)

#### **Plan is a net benefit to the permutation.**

#### **a.) The very idea of housing in Yucca Mountain is the standing reserve mentality.**

Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, ‘5

[Brian and Theo (Centre for the Study of Technology and Organisation, Lancaster University Management School), “The secret of Yucca Mountain: reflections on an object in extremis”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2005, volume 23, page 741]

The Yucca Mountain project has been officially trumpeted as the long sought after solution to nuclear waste, but for many others in US society (and beyond) the repository has a very different meaning. If Heidegger (1977) bemoaned what the siting of a hydroelectric plant had done to the Rhine, the technological revealing of nature as standing reserve, the outcry over Yucca Mountain by various US native peoples is no less notable. Indeed, for them the repository implies an act not of purification but, rather, one of defilement. Yucca Mountain has ``long been a place of powerful spiritual energy for the Shoshone and the Paiute. The water in the area is sacred, too, as it is with many desert peoples'' (http://www.sacredland.org/endangered sites pages/ yucca mountain.html). Further, Erikson observes: ``Shoshone and Paiute natives \_ see that whole tract as part of an ancient claim and view its use by federal agencies as `willful trespass'. They have been using Yucca Mountain for at least twelve thousand years ... . The very idea of injecting the most virulent poisons ever known into the body of a mountain seems to them an insult to the earth, an affront to ancestors, and a violation of natural good sense'' (1994, pages 208 ^ 209). Clearly, then, the object Yucca Mountain as well as the idea of turning it into a repository for nuclear waste are perceived within a variety of interpretative horizons. Their meaning and value are formed in relation to a number of different historical, cultural, economic, and political contexts.

#### Reprocessing solves the storage of waste in Yucca Mountain.

Broad 95 (William, NYT staff, Scientists fear atomic explosion of buried waste, The New York Times, March 5, p. 1)

Dr. Bowman says the explosion thesis is alive and well. On Friday he finished an 11-page draft paper thick with graphs and equations that lays it out in new detail.¶ The team criticisms, he said in an interview, repeatedly fall flat. For instance, dispersal could happen relatively quickly, especially if water percolated through the dump. Even if slow, plutonium 239 decays into uranium 235, which harbors the same explosive risks but requires millions of years to decay into less dangerous elements.¶ So too with the other criticisms, he says. Water could aid the slowing of neutrons and make sure the reaction went forward rather than automatically slowing down. And a pile could explode, he insists, while conceding that the blast from a single one might have a force of a few hundred tons of high explosive rather than the thousand or more originally envisioned.¶ On the other hand, his new paper says plutonium in amounts as small as one kilogram, or 2.2 pounds, could be dangerous.¶ "We got some helpful criticism and that, combined with additional work, has made our thesis even stronger," he said.¶ The most basic solution, Dr. Bowman said, would be removing all fissionable material from nuclear waste in a process known as reprocessing or by transmuting it in his proposed accelerator. Other possible steps would include making steel canisters smaller and spreading them out over larger areas in underground galleries -- expensive steps in a project already expected to cost $15 billion or more.¶ A different precaution, Dr. Bowman said, would be to abandon the Yucca site, where the volcanic ground is relatively soluble. Instead, the deep repository might be dug in granite, where migration of materials would be slower and more difficult.

#### **b.) SQUO treats atomic energy as an standing reserve, concealing the problems with waste.**

Rawles, Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh, 2k

[Richard, “Coyote Learns to Glow”, Part of “Learning to Glow: A Nuclear Reader”, RSR]

Humans, having gathered uranium from the New Mexican desert not all that far from Yucca Mountain, have harnessed the energy within the atom, for commercial and security purposes, in effect by “tricking" nature out of its secret power. We are aided in our industry by this supposedly "free” energy source. As Martin Heidegger observed, we regard the natural world as a “standing reserve:’ there for the plundering-the military metaphor is more than apt in this case. Having stolen from nature its hidden fire, we delude ourselves into believing that there’s no reckoning, no balancing of accounts, despite even the scientific evidence, § Marked 20:17 § which tells us there are no free meals in nature’s unforgiving cycles. We are burdened by the waste from this virtual cornucopia, much as the Greeks of the early classical period projected into Pandora's box of woes the burdens of civilizing fire—its destructive aspects, along with the rituals needed to maintain the fire.

## 1AR

### Warming

#### Most studies conclude no natural ice age coming for 10,000 years

Revkin 8 (Andrew C. Revkenm, Environment reporter, 2008, “Skeptics on human climate impact seize on cold spell, NEW YORK TIMES, Lexis)

Despite the recent trend toward global warming, scientists have long wondered whether the Earth is nearing a new ice age, an end to the 12,000-year temperate spell in which civilizations arose. Some have said such a transition is overdue, given that each of the three temperate intervals that immediately preceded this current one lasted only about 10,000 years. But now, in an eagerly awaited study, a group of climate and ice experts say they have new evidence that Earth is not even halfway through the current warm era. The evidence comes from the oldest layers of Antarctic ice ever sampled. Some scientists earlier proposed similar hypotheses, basing them on the configuration of Earth's orbit, which seems to set the metronome that ice ages dance to. Temperature patterns deciphered in sea sediments in recent years backed the theory. But experts say the new ice data are by far the strongest corroborating evidence, revealing many similarities between today's atmospheric and temperature patterns and those of a warm interval, with a duration of 28,000 years, that reached its peak 430,000 years ago. The findings are described Thursday in the journal Nature in a report by the European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica. The evidence comes from a shaft of ice extracted over five grueling years from Antarctica's deep-frozen innards, composed of thousands of ice layers formed as each year's snowfall was compressed over time. The deepest ice retrieved so far comes from 10,000 feet deep and dates back 740,000 years. The relative abundance of certain forms of hydrogen in the ice reflects past air temperatures. Many ice cores have been cut from various glaciers and ice sheets around the world, but until now none have gone back beyond 420,000 years. "It's very exciting to see ice that fell as snow three-quarters of a million years ago," said Dr. Eric Wolff, an author of the paper and ice core expert with the British Antarctic Survey.

### PRISM PIC

#### PRISM reactors have same problem as conventional IFRs – not commerciable, waste issues and prolif risks.

Pearce, reelance author and journalist based in the UK, ‘12

[Fred, serves as environmental consultant for New Scientist magazine and is the author of numerous books, including When The Rivers Run Dry and With Speed and Violence, “Are Fast-Breeder Reactors A Nuclear Power Panacea?”, Yale Environment 360, 7-30-12,

<http://e360.yale.edu/feature/are_fast-breeder_reactors_a_nuclear_power_panacea/2557/>, RSR]

The skeptics include Adrian Simper, the strategy director of the UK’s Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, which will be among those organizations deciding whether to back the PRISM plan. Simper warned last November in an internal memorandum that fast reactors were “not credible” as a solution to Britain’s plutonium problem because they had “still to be demonstrated commercially” and could not be deployed within 25 years. The technical challenges include the fact that it would require converting the plutonium powder into a metal alloy, with uranium and zirconium. This would be a large-scale industrial activity on its own that would create “a likely large amount of plutonium-contaminated salt waste,” § Marked 21:25 § Simper said. Simper is also concerned that the plutonium metal, once prepared for the reactor, would be even more vulnerable to theft for making bombs than the powdered oxide. This view is shared by the Union of Concerned Scientists in the U.S., which argues that plutonium liberated from spent fuel in preparation for recycling “would be dangerously vulnerable to theft or misuse.”